Buchanan Alec
Division of Law and Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law. 2008;36(1):25-6.
While the question of whether our actions are determined or are the result of free will is a deep one in philosophy, it does not need to be answered for forensic psychiatrists to give evidence in court. As Stephen Morse has pointed out, the absence of free will is not named as an excusing condition. The insanity defense, for instance, requires proof of functional impairment, to which psychiatrists can usefully testify. Of the approaches available to determinism, my own preference is that of Herbert Hart: until we know that determinism is true, we will continue to prefer a system that requires persons to have made proper choices to act as they did before we hold them responsible. This seems to resemble Dr. Felthous' preferred option, that mentally responsible choices are choices made in the presence of a relatively natural ability to have decided otherwise.
虽然我们的行为是由决定论支配还是自由意志的结果这一问题在哲学中是个深刻的问题,但法医精神病学家在法庭上提供证据并不需要回答这个问题。正如斯蒂芬·莫尔斯所指出的,缺乏自由意志并未被列为免责条件。例如,精神错乱抗辩需要证明功能受损,精神病学家可以就此提供有益的证词。在决定论的各种观点中,我个人倾向于赫伯特·哈特的观点:在我们知道决定论为真之前,我们会继续倾向于这样一种体系,即在我们追究人们的责任之前,要求他们做出了恰当的选择才会如此行事。这似乎类似于费尔索斯博士所偏好的选项,即精神上应负责任的选择是在具备相对自然的能力做出其他决定的情况下做出的选择。