McDougall R
Centre for Health and Society, Level 4, 207 Bouverie St, University of Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia.
J Med Ethics. 2008 Apr;34(4):259-61. doi: 10.1136/jme.2006.018804.
The claim that human reproductive cloning constitutes an affront to human dignity became a familiar one in 1997 as policymakers and bioethicists responded to the announcement of the birth of Dolly the sheep. Various versions of the argument that reproductive cloning is an affront to human dignity have been made, most focusing on the dignity of the child produced by cloning. However, these arguments tend to be unpersuasive and strongly criticised in the bioethical literature. In this paper I put forward a different argument that reproductive cloning is an affront to human dignity, one that looks beyond the dignity of the child produced. I suggest that allocating funds to such a pursuit can affront human dignity by diverting resources away from those existing people who lack sufficient health to enable them to exercise basic rights and liberties. This version of the argument posits cloning as an affront to human dignity in particular circumstances, rather than claiming the technology as intrinsically inconsistent with human dignity.
1997年，随着政策制定者和生物伦理学家对多利羊诞生的宣布做出回应，人类生殖性克隆构成对人类尊严的冒犯这一说法变得耳熟能详。关于生殖性克隆是对人类尊严的冒犯这一论点有多种版本，大多数都聚焦于克隆所产生孩子的尊严。然而，这些论点往往缺乏说服力，并在生物伦理文献中受到强烈批评。在本文中，我提出了一个不同的论点，即生殖性克隆是对人类尊严的冒犯，这个论点超越了所产生孩子的尊严。我认为，为这样一项研究提供资金会将资源从那些健康状况不足以使其行使基本权利和自由的现存人群中转移出来，从而冒犯人类尊严。这个版本的论点将克隆设定为在特定情况下对人类尊严的冒犯，而不是声称该技术本质上与人类尊严不一致。
