Edwards S D
Centre for Philosophy, Humanities and Law in Healthcare, Swansea University, Swansea SA2 8PP, UK.
J Med Ethics. 2008 May;34(5):341-3. doi: 10.1136/jme.2007.020743.
This "current controversies" contribution describes the recent case of a severely disabled six year old girl who has been subjected to a range of medical interventions at the request of her parents and with the permission of a hospital clinical ethics committee. The interventions prescribed have become known as "the Ashley treatment" and involve the performance of invasive medical procedures (eg, hysterectomy) and oestrogen treatment. A central aim of the treatment is to restrict the growth of the child and thus make it easier for her parents to care for her at home. The paper below discusses the main objections to the treatment. It concludes that the most serious concern raised by the case is that it may set a worrying precedent if the moral principle employed in justification of the treatment is applied again to endorse it in similar circumstances. Finally, it raises the possibility that that same moral principle may even be invoked to justify more radical interventions than those that were actually performed in the Ashley treatment.
这篇“当前争议”文章讲述了最近一个案例，一名严重残疾的六岁女孩在其父母的要求下，并经医院临床伦理委员会批准，接受了一系列医疗干预措施。所规定的这些干预措施被称为“阿什莉治疗”，包括实施侵入性医疗程序（如子宫切除术）和雌激素治疗。该治疗的一个核心目的是限制孩子的生长，从而使她的父母在家中照顾她变得更容易。下面的论文讨论了对该治疗的主要反对意见。结论是，该案例引发的最严重担忧是，如果用于为该治疗辩护的道德原则在类似情况下再次被应用以支持它，可能会开创一个令人担忧的先例。最后，文章提出了一种可能性，即同一道德原则甚至可能被用来为比阿什莉治疗中实际实施的更为激进的干预措施辩护。
