The optimality of hospital financing system: the role of physician-manager interactions.

The ability of a prospective payment system to ensure an optimal level of both quality and cost reducing activities in the hospital industry has been stressed by Ma (Ma, J Econ Manage Strategy 8(2):93-112, 1994) whose analysis assumes that decisions about quality and costs are made by a single agent. This paper examines whether this result holds when the main decisions made within the hospital are shared between physicians (quality of treatment) and hospital managers (cost reduction). Ma's conclusions appear to be relevant in the US context (where the hospital managers pay the whole cost of treatment). Nonetheless, when physicians partly reimburse hospitals for the treatment cost as it is the case in many European countries, we show that the ability of a prospective payment system to achieve both objectives is sensitive to the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making) between the agents. Our analysis suggests that regulation policies in the hospital sector should not be exclusively focused on the financing system but should also take the interaction between physicians and hospital managers into account.