Monestes J L, Villatte M, Moore A, Yon V, Loas G
Laboratoire de neurosciences fonctionnelles et pathologies, CNRS 8160, hôpital Philippe-Pinel, 80044 Amiens, France.
Encephale. 2008 Apr;34(2):116-22. doi: 10.1016/j.encep.2007.05.003. Epub 2007 Sep 6.
Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as a capacity to infer mental states, intentions, and emotions in others. Two principal theories in the field of cognitive psychology have tried to explain mechanisms underlying this capacity. Theory-theory hypothesizes that people interpret cues from others in social interactions with a folk psychology composed of data about social human behavior. In contrast, Simulation-Theory proposes a capacity to take different perspectives and mentally simulate others' behavior. As a result, one could guess a person's intention or emotion by comparison with his state of mind when he/she behaves in the same way.
Difficulties in ToM have been frequently observed in schizotypal subjects and subjects with schizophrenia. Some authors have proposed that this impairment could lead to persecution delusions or be linked with disorganized thought. A tendency to make choices with few cues in conditional situation has also been observed in both populations. When they are asked to make a decision about cues they can choose to see or not, schizotypal subjects and patients with schizophrenia tend to make up their mind after significantly less cues than control subjects. This tendency has been called "jump to conclusion".
Our study tests the correlation between low performances at a ToM task and a tendency to jump to conclusion in conditional situation.
We tested this hypothesis with 25 participants scoring high on a social anhedonia scale (J Abnorm Psychol 85 (1976) 374-382), one of the main characteristics of schizotypy, and with 20 control participants. Participants were students with a mean age of 20. We included in the experimental group, subjects with a score on social anhedonia scale superior to 17 for females and 19 for males, and seven for control participants (modal score).
We used "jar and beads", a conditional reasoning task. Two jars are presented to a participant: a white one containing 85% of white beads and 15% of black beads, and a black one filled with the opposite ratio. The participant has to decide from which jar comes successive beads shown to him. Dependent measure is the number of beads seen before decision. ToM task is an adaptation from (Schizophr Res 17 (1995) 5-13). Twenty short interactions between two characters are read to a participant. For example: John has a phone call with a friend for one hour. He says: "My mother ought to call me in a few minutes".
What does John really mean? Cue: John adds: "I could call you tomorrow morning".
What does John want to do?
Results show significantly lower performances at the ToM task in experimental than in control participants (52.36 (S.D., 6.73) vs. 59.05 (S.D., 1.60); t, 4.33; p<0.001; maximum possible, 60). The experimental group asked for significantly less cues to conclude in the conditional situation (2.22-S.D., 1.29). Mean number of beads asked for in the control group was 3.05 (S.D., 1.30) and t, 2.13; p<0.05. There was no correlation between performances at conditional reasoning task and ToM task. We observed this absence of correlation in all of the participants and in the experimental and control groups separately.
Absence of relationship between performances in both tasks may be attributed to a discrepancy between experimental and ecological contexts for conditional reasoning task. During interpersonal relationships, search for cues in order to make a decision about others' intentions and mental states represents a real cost in terms of energy and time. These costs are absent in the "jar and beads situation". Moreover, people with social anhedonia may attribute a special value of quickly understanding personal interactions. This conditional reasoning task does not imply this parameter.
Ecological decision in conditional reasoning tasks could be approached by adding a system of points to spend, asking for more cues, or to earn, finally finding the correct answer. Decision would then depend on the ratio between possible gains, by guessing or not the correct answer, and the cost of searching for more cues before making a decision.
心理理论(ToM)被定义为推断他人心理状态、意图和情感的能力。认知心理学领域的两种主要理论试图解释这种能力背后的机制。理论论假设人们在社会互动中通过由关于人类社会行为的数据组成的民间心理学来解释来自他人的线索。相比之下,模拟理论提出了一种能够采取不同视角并在心理上模拟他人行为的能力。因此,人们可以通过与自己在以相同方式行事时的心理状态进行比较来猜测一个人的意图或情感。
在分裂型人格障碍患者和精神分裂症患者中经常观察到心理理论方面的困难。一些作者提出这种损害可能导致被害妄想或与思维紊乱有关。在这两类人群中还观察到在条件情境中根据很少线索做出选择的倾向。当被要求就他们可以选择查看或不查看的线索做出决定时,分裂型人格障碍患者和精神分裂症患者往往在比对照组少得多的线索之后就下定决心。这种倾向被称为“急于下结论”。
我们的研究测试了心理理论任务表现不佳与在条件情境中急于下结论的倾向之间的相关性。
我们用25名在社交快感缺乏量表(《变态心理学杂志》85 (1976) 374 - 382)上得分较高的参与者(分裂型人格障碍的主要特征之一)以及20名对照参与者来测试这一假设。参与者为平均年龄20岁的学生。我们将社交快感缺乏量表得分高于女性17分、男性19分的受试者纳入实验组,对照组参与者的得分阈值为7分(众数得分)。
我们使用了“罐子与珠子”这一条件推理任务。向一名参与者展示两个罐子:一个白色罐子装有85%的白色珠子和15%的黑色珠子,一个黑色罐子装有相反的比例。参与者必须决定给他看的连续珠子来自哪个罐子。因变量是做出决定前看到的珠子数量。心理理论任务改编自(《精神分裂症研究》17 (1995) 5 - 13)。向一名参与者朗读两个角色之间的20个简短互动。例如:约翰和一个朋友打了一个小时电话。他说:“我妈妈几分钟后应该会给我打电话”。
约翰真正的意思是什么?线索:约翰补充说:“我明天早上可以给你打电话”。
约翰想做什么?
结果显示实验组在心理理论任务上的表现显著低于对照组(52.36(标准差,6.73)对59.05(标准差,1.60);t值,4.33;p < 0.001;最高可能值,60)。实验组在条件情境中做出结论所需的线索显著更少(2.22 - 标准差,1.29)。对照组要求看到的珠子平均数量为3.05(标准差,1.30),t值,2.13;p < 0.05。条件推理任务和心理理论任务的表现之间没有相关性。我们在所有参与者以及分别在实验组和对照组中都观察到了这种缺乏相关性的情况。
两项任务表现之间缺乏关联可能归因于条件推理任务的实验情境与生态情境之间的差异。在人际关系中,为了对他人的意图和心理状态做出决定而寻找线索在精力和时间方面代表着实际成本。在“罐子与珠子情境”中不存在这些成本。此外,患有社交快感缺乏症的人可能赋予快速理解人际互动特殊价值。这个条件推理任务并未涉及这个参数。
可以通过添加一个用于花费的点数系统来接近条件推理任务中的生态决策,要求更多线索,或者通过最终找到正确答案来赚取点数。然后决策将取决于通过猜测正确答案与否可能获得的收益与在做出决定前寻找更多线索的成本之间的比率。