Pineda J A, Hecht E
Department of Cognitive Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0515, USA.
Biol Psychol. 2009 Mar;80(3):306-14. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2008.11.003. Epub 2008 Nov 21.
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan [Tager-Flusberg, H., Sullivan, K., 2000. A componential view of theory of mind: evidence from Williams syndrome. Cognition 76, 59-90] have argued for a distinction between the social-perceptive component of theory of mind (ToM), involving judgment of mental state from facial and body expressions, and the social-cognitive component, which is representation-based and linked to language and theory-building. This is analogous to the distinction made by others [Gallese, V., Keysers, C., Rizzolatti, G., 2004. A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Science 8, 396-403] between representing the mental state of another as if it was one's own (simulation theory), which requires involvement of the mirror neuron system, and explicit or declarative reasoning about mental states (theory theory), which does not. This componential view of ToM was tested by examining mirroring, as indexed by EEG mu rhythm suppression, in subjects performing tasks assumed to tap both dimensions. Mu suppression was positively correlated with accuracy on the social-perceptual task but not in the social-cognitive task. In a ToM control task requiring judgments about person-object interactions accuracy was correlated with mu suppression. This implies that mirroring is involved in making judgments about emotions and person-object interactions. However, mirroring is insensitive to the distinction between correct and incorrect inferences in the social-cognitive task suggesting that additional mechanisms are needed to make mental attributions of beliefs and intentions. These results are consistent with a refined componential view of ToM.
塔杰-弗卢斯伯格和沙利文[塔杰-弗卢斯伯格，H.，沙利文，K.，2000年。心理理论的成分观：来自威廉姆斯综合征的证据。《认知》76卷，第59 - 90页]主张区分心理理论（ToM）的社会感知成分和社会认知成分，前者涉及从面部和身体表情判断心理状态，后者基于表征，与语言和理论构建相关。这类似于其他人[加莱塞，V.，凯瑟斯，C.，里佐拉蒂，G.，2004年。社会认知基础的统一观点。《认知科学趋势》8卷，第396 - 403页]所做的区分，即把他人的心理状态表征为好像是自己的心理状态（模拟理论），这需要镜像神经元系统的参与，以及对心理状态的明确或陈述性推理（理论理论），后者则不需要。通过检查执行被认为涉及这两个维度任务的受试者的脑电图μ节律抑制所索引的镜像，对ToM的这种成分观进行了测试。μ抑制与社会感知任务的准确性呈正相关，但与社会认知任务的准确性无关。在一项要求对人 - 对象互动进行判断的ToM控制任务中，准确性与μ抑制相关。这意味着镜像参与了对情绪和人 - 对象互动的判断。然而，在社会认知任务中，镜像对正确和错误推理之间的区分不敏感，这表明需要额外的机制来对信念和意图进行心理归因。这些结果与ToM的一种细化成分观一致。
