Pak Chul, Cauley Kashana
Antitrust Group, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, USA.
J Health Life Sci Law. 2008 Jul;1(4):95, 97-116.
This article examines the Federal Trade Commission's Evanston decision and assesses its future impact on hospital merger analysis. In finding that a consummated merger of two Chicago-area hospitals violated the antitrust laws, the FTC analyzed the merger using a unilateral effects theory of anticompetitive harm. This theory entails examining the competitive impact on third-party payors as a result of the loss of competition between the merging hospitals, rather than the traditional market share and market structure data relied upon in earlier court decisions. After a detailed discussion of the Evanston decision and the history of hospital merger litigation leading up to it, the authors argue that while the Evanston decision indicates that the government will use unilateral effects analysis in challenging future hospital mergers, this analysis is fraught with litigation challenges. The government's next case will not have the benefit of a strong evidentiary record as in Evanston, thereby making it more difficult for the government to prove its unilateral effects theory.
本文审视了联邦贸易委员会关于埃文斯顿的裁决，并评估其对医院合并分析的未来影响。联邦贸易委员会认定，芝加哥地区两家医院的合并完成违反了反垄断法，该委员会运用单边效应的反竞争损害理论对此次合并进行了分析。这一理论需要考察合并医院之间竞争的丧失对第三方支付方造成的竞争影响，而非早期法院判决所依赖的传统市场份额和市场结构数据。在详细讨论了埃文斯顿裁决以及此前医院合并诉讼的历史之后，作者们认为，虽然埃文斯顿裁决表明政府将在质疑未来医院合并时运用单边效应分析，但这种分析充满了诉讼挑战。政府的下一个案件将不会像埃文斯顿案那样拥有强有力的证据记录，从而使政府更难证明其单边效应理论。
