Delisle Richard G
Philosophy and Liberal Education, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta T1K 3M4, Canada.
Hist Philos Life Sci. 2008;30(2):207-26.
The holism/reductionism debate in evolutionary biology has often been analysed as involving two main phenomenological levels within neo-Darwinism: genetic and organismic. This analytical framework assumes that explanation in evolution is either found in the field of genetics or the field of organismic biology. It is argued here that this framework is far too restrictive to incorporate what at least some founding members of neo-Darwinism had in mind in their search for the ultimate cause of evolution. Dobzhansky's "super-holism" locates this drive in the highest possible entity imaginable--an ontologically unified evolutionary cosmos--while Rensch's ontological "super-reductionism," on the other hand, places it at the lowest possible entity of microphysics, that is, at the level of an energetic field of protopsychical nature. Not only it is suggested that a much-expanded framework is required for analysing the holism/reductionism debate in neo-Darwinism, but also that this new framework may have implications for the conceptualization of the neo-Darwinian movement itself.
进化生物学中的整体论/还原论之争,常常被分析为涉及新达尔文主义内部的两个主要现象学层面:基因层面和有机体层面。这一分析框架假定,进化的解释要么在遗传学领域,要么在有机体生物学领域。本文认为,这个框架限制过多,无法纳入新达尔文主义的至少一些奠基者在探寻进化终极原因时的想法。杜布赞斯基的“超级整体论”将这种驱动力置于可以想象的最高实体——一个本体论上统一的进化宇宙——而伦施的本体论“超级还原论”,另一方面,将其置于微观物理学的最低实体层面,即原心理性质的能量场层面。不仅有人提出,需要一个大幅扩展的框架来分析新达尔文主义中的整体论/还原论之争,而且这个新框架可能对新达尔文主义运动本身的概念化有影响。