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“你为何(不)问?”移情与(不)求知欲。

"Why do (don't) you ask?" Transference and the desire (not) to know.

作者信息

Friedlander S R

机构信息

University of Tennessee College of Medicine, Knoxville.

出版信息

Am J Psychoanal. 1991 Jun;51(2):117-35; discussion 137-44. doi: 10.1007/BF01252168.

Abstract

One of the criterial distinctions of psychoanalysis is its renunciation of indoctrination through suggestion. In spite of the fact that psychoanalysis is both an organized body of knowledge and a disciplined form of interpersonal influence, it regards an analyst who tells the analysand what to think or do as essentially doing harm by substituting a new form of prejudice and alienation for the preexisting form he is attacking. Even though an analyst regards his knowledge of psychoanalytic theory as adequate at a general level, this "truth" is not an adequate mode of discourse with an individual. Why not? It is a fact that analysands often do not accept an analyst's idea. However, the fundamental problematic of clinical psychoanalysis comes precisely at the point that the analysand would accept the analyst's idea, involving the distinction between a properly psychoanalytic cure and a transference cure. Psychoanalytic theory itself holds that unreflective incorporation of another's idea about oneself comes at the expense of autonomous and spontaneous self-revelation. Despite its resolute pursuit of new truths, the aim of psychoanalysis is less concerned with attaining specific ideas about unrecognized conflicts than it is with achieving a general attitude--that self-understanding requires a capacity to admit dubious and unwanted ideas and feelings that symptoms, dreams, and free associations bring to light. This "psychoanalytic" attitude permits a new type of discourse in which the person recognizes himself or herself through expression, rather than parrotting the analyst's (or others') words, or continuing rigidly to hide the truth of desire for oneself. In the long run, psychoanalysis offers to correct a primary misunderstanding: that one can acquire a comprehensively true image of oneself. As Barratt (1988) emphasizes, this transformation is tantamount to a change in personal epistemology for the analysand and a change in epistemological theory for the culture as a whole. In our culture, most analysts and lay people alike take for granted that the ego is an agent that is to be integrated and strengthened in order to direct one's life. Likewise, the unconscious is commonly regarded as a type of savage alter ego that must be mastered by the ego. According to Lacan's critique, the ego is a snare and a delusion for the patient, however highly commended by society it may be, because its very essence is to furnish the illusion of enduring self-knowledge.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)

摘要

精神分析的一个关键区别在于它摒弃了通过暗示进行灌输。尽管精神分析既是一套有组织的知识体系,也是一种规范的人际影响形式,但它认为,分析师若告诉受分析者该思考什么或做什么,本质上是在造成伤害,因为这是以一种新的偏见和异化形式取代了他所抨击的既有形式。即便分析师认为自己对精神分析理论的了解在总体层面上是足够的,但这种“真理”并非与个体交流的恰当方式。为什么呢?事实上,受分析者常常不接受分析师的观点。然而,临床精神分析的根本问题恰恰出现在受分析者会接受分析师观点这一点上,这涉及到恰当的精神分析治疗与移情治疗之间的区别。精神分析理论本身认为,不假思索地接受他人对自己的看法是以自主和自发的自我揭示为代价的。尽管精神分析坚定地追求新的真理,但其目标与其说是关注获得关于未被认识到的冲突的具体观点,不如说是关注达成一种总体态度——即自我理解需要有能力承认症状、梦境和自由联想所揭示的可疑且 unwanted 的想法和感受。这种“精神分析”态度允许一种新型的话语,在其中,人通过表达来认识自己,而不是鹦鹉学舌般重复分析师(或他人)的话,也不是继续顽固地对自己隐藏欲望的真相。从长远来看,精神分析旨在纠正一个主要的误解:即人可以获得关于自己的全面真实的形象。正如巴拉特(1988)所强调的,这种转变对受分析者而言相当于个人认识论的改变,对整个文化而言相当于认识论理论的改变。在我们的文化中,大多数分析师和普通人都理所当然地认为,自我是一个需要整合和强化以便指导人生的主体。同样,无意识通常被视为一种野蛮的另一个自我,必须由自我来掌控。根据拉康的批判,自我对患者来说是一个陷阱和错觉,无论它在社会上可能受到多高的赞扬,因为其本质就是提供持久自我认知的幻觉。(摘要截取自400字) (注:原文中“unwanted”未翻译完整,可能是有遗漏信息,这里按原样呈现)

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