Vergara-Silva Francisco
Laboratorio de Sistemática Molecular (Jardín Botánico), Instituto de Biología, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 3er. Circuito Exterior, Ciudad Universitaria, Coyoacán, 04510 México, D.F., Mexico.
Acta Biotheor. 2009 Jun;57(1-2):269-94. doi: 10.1007/s10441-009-9083-z. Epub 2009 Jun 9.
Despite the amount of work that has been produced on the subject over the years, the 'transformation of cladistics' is still a misunderstood episode in the history of comparative biology. Here, I analyze two outstanding, highly contrasting historiographic accounts on the matter, under the perspective of an influential dichotomy in the philosophy of science: the opposition between Scientific Realism and Empiricism. Placing special emphasis on the notion of 'causal grounding' of morphological characters (sensu Olivier Rieppel) in modern developmental biology's (mechanistic) theories, I arrive at the conclusion that a 'new transformation of cladistics' is philosophically plausible. This 'reformed' understanding of 'pattern cladistics' entails retaining the interpretation of cladograms as 'schemes of synapomorphies', but in association to construing cladogram nodes as 'developmental-genetic taxic homologies', instead of 'standard Darwinian ancestors'. The reinterpretation of pattern cladistics presented here additionally proposes to take Bas Van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism' as a philosophical stance that could properly support such analysis of developmental-genetic data for systematic purposes. The latter suggestion is justified through a reappraisal of previous ideas developed by prominent pattern cladists (mainly, Colin Patterson), which concerned a scientifically efficient 'observable/non-observable distinction' linked to the conceptual pair 'ontogeny and phylogeny'. Finally, I argue that a robust articulation of Antirealist alternatives in systematics may provide a rational basis for its disciplinary separation from evolutionary biology, as well as for a critical reconsideration of the proper role of certain Scientific Realist positions, currently popular in comparative biology.
尽管多年来围绕该主题已经产生了大量研究成果，但“分支系统学的转变”在比较生物学史上仍然是一个被误解的阶段。在此，我从科学哲学中一个有影响力的二分法视角，即科学实在论与经验论的对立，分析了关于此事的两种杰出且形成强烈对比的史学观点。特别强调现代发育生物学（机械论）理论中形态特征（按照奥利维耶·里佩尔的理解）的“因果基础”概念，我得出结论，“分支系统学的新转变”在哲学上是合理的。这种对“模式分支系统学”的“改革后”理解需要保留将分支图解释为“共近裔性状的模式”，但要将分支图节点解释为“发育 - 遗传分类同源性”，而非“标准达尔文式祖先”。这里提出的对模式分支系统学的重新解释还建议将巴斯·范·弗拉森的“建构经验论”作为一种哲学立场，它能够恰当地支持为系统发育目的而对发育 - 遗传数据进行的此类分析。通过重新审视杰出的模式分支系统学家（主要是科林·帕特森）先前提出的观点，证明了后一种建议的合理性，这些观点涉及与概念对“个体发育和系统发育”相关的科学上有效的“可观察/不可观察区分”。最后，我认为在系统学中对反实在论替代方案进行有力阐述，可能为其与进化生物学的学科分离提供合理依据，也为批判性重新思考当前在比较生物学中流行的某些科学实在论立场的恰当作用提供依据。
