Dickmann Petra, Keith Kelly, Comer Chris, Abraham Gordon, Gopal Robin, Marui Eiji
Frankfurt University Hospital, Department of Infectious Diseases, Germany.
Biosecur Bioterror. 2009 Jun;7(2):227-33. doi: 10.1089/bsp.2009.0023.
Working with highly pathogenic agents such as Ebola or Marburg virus in the context of infection control or biodefense research requires high-biocontainment laboratories of the Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) to protect researchers and laboratory staff from infection and to prevent the unintentional release of harmful agents. The public perception of research on highly pathogenic agents and the operation of high-containment facilities is often ambivalent: while the output of the biomedical research is highly valued, the existence of a BSL-4 lab is often viewed with concern. Biomedical research perspectives and public perceptions often differ and can lead to tensions that could have negative effects on research, society, and politics. Therefore, risk communication plays a crucial role in siting, building, and operating a high-containment facility. The Japanese government invited risk communication experts and scientists from Canada, the U.S., Europe, and Australia to discuss their risk communication strategies for BSL-4 labs. This article describes the international perspective on risk communication and gives recommendations for successful strategies.
在感染控制或生物防御研究中,处理诸如埃博拉或马尔堡病毒等高致病性病原体,需要生物安全4级(BSL-4)的高生物安全实验室,以保护研究人员和实验室工作人员免受感染,并防止有害病原体的意外释放。公众对高致病性病原体研究和高防护设施运营的看法往往是矛盾的:虽然生物医学研究的成果备受重视,但BSL-4实验室的存在却常常令人担忧。生物医学研究的观点与公众认知往往存在差异,可能导致紧张关系,进而对研究、社会和政治产生负面影响。因此,风险沟通在高防护设施的选址、建设和运营中起着至关重要的作用。日本政府邀请了来自加拿大、美国、欧洲和澳大利亚的风险沟通专家和科学家,讨论他们针对BSL-4实验室的风险沟通策略。本文介绍了风险沟通的国际视角,并给出成功策略的建议。