University of Vermont, USA.
J Health Polit Policy Law. 2010 Feb;35(1):63-93. doi: 10.1215/03616878-2009-041.
This article investigates the relationship between the characteristics of medical licensing boards and the frequency with which boards discipline physicians. Specifically, we take advantage of variation in the structure of medical licensing boards between 1993 and 2003 to determine the effect of organizational and budgetary independence, public oversight, and resource constraints on rates of physician discipline. We find that larger licensing boards, boards with more staff, and boards that are organizationally independent from state government discipline doctors more frequently. Public oversight and political control over board budgets do not appear to influence the extent to which medical licensing boards discipline doctors. These findings are broadly consistent with theories of regulatory behavior that emphasize the importance of bureaucratic autonomy for effective regulatory enforcement.
本文研究了医疗执照管理机构的特点与该机构对医生进行纪律处分的频率之间的关系。具体而言，我们利用 1993 年至 2003 年期间医疗执照管理机构结构的变化，来确定组织和预算独立性、公众监督以及资源限制对医生纪律处分率的影响。我们发现，规模较大、人员较多且在组织上独立于州政府的执照管理机构更频繁地对医生进行纪律处分。公众监督和对执照管理机构预算的政治控制似乎并未影响医疗执照管理机构对医生进行纪律处分的程度。这些发现与强调官僚自治对有效监管执行重要性的监管行为理论基本一致。
