Ng See-Kee, Seah Winston K G
Singapore Technologies Kinetics, Singapore 619523.
IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern B Cybern. 2010 Jun;40(3):559-74. doi: 10.1109/TSMCB.2010.2042593. Epub 2010 Mar 4.
Traditional networks are built on the assumption that network entities cooperate based on a mandatory network communication semantic to achieve desirable qualities such as efficiency and scalability. Over the years, this assumption has been eroded by the emergence of users that alter network behavior in a way to benefit themselves at the expense of others. At one extreme, a malicious user/node may eavesdrop on sensitive data or deliberately inject packets into the network to disrupt network operations. The solution to this generally lies in encryption and authentication. In contrast, a rational node acts only to achieve an outcome that he desires most. In such a case, cooperation is still achievable if the outcome is to the best interest of the node. The node misbehavior problem would be more pronounced in multihop wireless networks like mobile ad hoc and sensor networks, which are typically made up of wireless battery-powered devices that must cooperate to forward packets for one another. However, cooperation may be hard to maintain as it consumes scarce resources such as bandwidth, computational power, and battery power. This paper applies game theory to achieve collusive networking behavior in such network environments. In this paper, pricing, promiscuous listening, and mass punishments are avoided altogether. Our model builds on recent work in the field of Economics on the theory of imperfect private monitoring for the dynamic Bertrand oligopoly, and adapts it to the wireless multihop network. The model derives conditions for collusive packet forwarding, truthful routing broadcasts, and packet acknowledgments under a lossy wireless multihop environment, thus capturing many important characteristics of the network layer and link layer in one integrated analysis that has not been achieved previously. We also provide a proof of the viability of the model under a theoretical wireless environment. Finally, we show how the model can be applied to design a generic protocol which we call the Selfishness Resilient Resource Reservation protocol, and validate the effectiveness of this protocol in ensuring cooperation using simulations.
传统网络的构建基于这样一种假设，即网络实体基于强制性的网络通信语义进行协作，以实现诸如效率和可扩展性等理想特性。多年来，这一假设已因一些用户的出现而受到侵蚀，这些用户以牺牲他人为代价改变网络行为以使自身受益。在一个极端情况下，恶意用户/节点可能窃听敏感数据或故意向网络中注入数据包以扰乱网络运行。对此问题的解决方案通常在于加密和认证。相比之下，理性节点仅采取行动以实现其最期望的结果。在这种情况下，如果结果符合节点的最大利益，合作仍然是可以实现的。节点行为不当问题在多跳无线网络（如移动自组织网络和传感器网络）中会更加突出，这些网络通常由无线电池供电设备组成，它们必须相互协作来转发数据包。然而，由于合作会消耗诸如带宽、计算能力和电池电量等稀缺资源，因此可能难以维持。本文应用博弈论在这样的网络环境中实现勾结性的网络行为。在本文中，完全避免了定价、混杂监听和大规模惩罚。我们的模型基于经济学领域最近关于动态伯特兰寡头垄断的不完全私人监测理论的研究，并将其应用于无线多跳网络。该模型推导了在有损无线多跳环境下勾结性数据包转发、真实路由广播和数据包确认的条件，从而在一个此前未实现的综合分析中捕捉了网络层和链路层的许多重要特征。我们还在理论无线环境下提供了该模型可行性的证明。最后，我们展示了该模型如何应用于设计一种通用协议，我们称之为自私抗性资源预留协议，并通过仿真验证该协议在确保合作方面的有效性。
