Liang Bryan A, Mackey Tim
Institute of Health Law Studies, California Western School of Law, USA.
Am J Law Med. 2010;36(1):136-87. doi: 10.1177/009885881003600103.
Individual conflicts of interest are rife in healthcare, and substantial attention has been given to address them. Yet a more substantive concern-institutional conflicts of interest ("ICOIs") in academic medical centers ("AMCs") engaged in research and clinical care-have yet to garner sufficient attention, despite their higher stakes for patient safety and welfare. ICOIs are standard in AMCs, are virtually unregulated, and have led to patient deaths. Upon review of ICOIs, we find a clear absence of substantive efforts to confront these conflicts. We also assess the Jesse Gelsinger case, which resulted in the death of a study participant exemplifying a deep-seated culture of institutional indifference and complicity in unmanaged conflicts. Federal policy, particularly the Bayh-Dole Act, also creates and promotes ICOIs. Efforts to address ICOIs are narrow or abstract, and do not provide for a systemic infrastructure with effective enforcement mechanisms. Hence, in this paper, we provide a comprehensive proposal to address ICOIs utilizing a "Centralized System" model that would proactively review, manage, approve, and conduct assessments of conflicts, and would have independent power to evaluate and enforce any violations via sanctions. It would also manage any industry funds and pharmaceutical samples and be a condition of participation in public healthcare reimbursement and federal grant funding. The ICOI policy itself would provide for disclosure requirements, separate management of commercial enterprise units from academic units, voluntary remediation of conflicts, and education on ICOIs. Finally, we propose a new model of medical education-academic detailing-in place of current marketing-focused "education." Using such a system, AMCs can wean themselves from industry reliance and promote a culture of accountability and independence from industry influence. By doing so, clinical research and treatment can return to a focus on patient care, not profits.
医疗保健领域中个人利益冲突普遍存在,人们已给予大量关注来解决这些冲突。然而,一个更实质性的问题——从事研究和临床护理的学术医疗中心(“AMC”)的机构利益冲突(“ICOI”)——尽管对患者安全和福祉有着更高的风险,但尚未得到足够的关注。ICOI在AMC中很常见,几乎不受监管,并且已导致患者死亡。在审查ICOI时,我们发现明显缺乏应对这些冲突的实质性努力。我们还评估了杰西·格尔辛格案,该案件导致一名研究参与者死亡,体现了在未管理的冲突中根深蒂固的机构冷漠和同谋文化。联邦政策,特别是《拜杜法案》,也产生并促进了ICOI。解决ICOI的努力狭隘或抽象,没有提供一个具有有效执行机制的系统基础设施。因此,在本文中,我们提出了一项全面的提议,利用“集中系统”模型来解决ICOI,该模型将主动审查、管理、批准和进行冲突评估,并拥有通过制裁评估和执行任何违规行为的独立权力。它还将管理任何行业资金和药品样本,并作为参与公共医疗保健报销和联邦拨款资助的条件。ICOI政策本身将规定披露要求、商业企业单位与学术单位的分开管理、冲突的自愿补救以及ICOI教育。最后,我们提出了一种新的医学教育模式——学术详述——以取代当前以营销为重点的“教育”。通过使用这样的系统,AMC可以摆脱对行业的依赖,促进一种问责制文化,并摆脱行业影响。通过这样做,临床研究和治疗可以回归到以患者护理而非利润为重点。