Chalmers Alan F
Philosophy Department, Flinders University, P.O. Box 2100, Adelaide 5001, Australia.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2010 Mar;41(1):1-10. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.001.
William Newman construes the Scientific Revolution as a change in matter theory, from a hylomorphic, Aristotelian to a corpuscular, mechanical one. He sees Robert Boyle as making a major contribution to that change by way of his corpuscular chemistry. In this article it is argued that it is seriously misleading to identify what was scientific about the Scientific Revolution in terms of a change in theories of the ultimate structure of matter. Boyle showed, especially in his pneumatics, how empirically accessible, intermediate causes, as opposed to ultimate, mechanical ones can be explored and identified by experiment. Newman is right to observe that Boyle constantly sought intimate links between chemistry and the mechanical philosophy. However, by doing so he did not thereby significantly aid the cause of attaining experimental knowledge of chemical phenomena and the support that Boyle's chemistry provided for the mechanical philosophy was weaker than both Boyle and Newman imply. Boyle was intent on articulating and defending a strict, mechanical account of the ultimate structure of matter to be sure, but his contributions to the new experimental science in general, and chemistry in particular, are best seen as distinct from that endeavour.
威廉·纽曼将科学革命解释为物质理论的一次转变，即从亚里士多德的质形论转变为微粒机械论。他认为罗伯特·波义耳通过其微粒化学对这一转变做出了重大贡献。本文认为，将科学革命的科学性归结为物质终极结构理论的变化是极具误导性的。波义耳尤其在其气体力学研究中表明，与终极的机械原因不同，通过实验可以探索和识别经验上可及的中间原因。纽曼观察到波义耳不断寻求化学与机械哲学之间的紧密联系，这一点是正确的。然而，他这样做并没有显著促进获取化学现象的实验知识，而且波义耳的化学为机械哲学提供的支持比波义耳和纽曼所暗示的都要薄弱。诚然，波义耳致力于阐明和捍卫对物质终极结构的严格机械解释，但他对一般新实验科学，尤其是化学的贡献，最好被视为与该努力截然不同。
