Enemark Christian
Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney.
J Law Med. 2010 May;17(5):748-60.
In 2009, under the National Health Security Act 2007 (Cth), the Australian Government began introducing biosecurity regulations for laboratory research and other work involving certain pathogenic micro-organisms. The Security-Sensitive Biological Agents (SSBA) scheme is virtually unprecedented in Australia but is similar to the Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSATs) scheme which has existed in the United States since the mid-1990s. This article examines recent United States experience in using domestic law as a national security tool to address the problem of biological weapons. The two lessons that emerge for Australia regarding biosecurity regulation are, first, that security threats can emanate from trusted laboratory personnel, even those with high-level security clearances; and secondly, governments need to manage the risk of imposing too great a regulatory burden. A reduction in potentially life-saving research, precipitated by scientists opting out of laboratory work, could undermine capacity to resist both natural infectious disease outbreaks and biological attacks.
2009年,根据2007年《澳大利亚联邦国家卫生安全法》,澳大利亚政府开始针对涉及某些致病微生物的实验室研究及其他工作出台生物安全法规。安全敏感生物制剂(SSBA)计划在澳大利亚几乎是史无前例的,但类似于自20世纪90年代中期以来在美国实施的生物选择制剂和毒素(BSAT)计划。本文探讨了美国近期利用国内法作为国家安全工具来应对生物武器问题的经验。澳大利亚在生物安全监管方面得到的两个教训是,第一,安全威胁可能来自受信任的实验室人员,即使是那些拥有高级安全许可的人员;第二,政府需要管理施加过重监管负担的风险。科学家退出实验室工作导致可能挽救生命的研究减少,这可能会削弱抵御自然传染病爆发和生物攻击的能力。