Nelson Mark T
Department of Philosophy, Westmont College, Santa Barbara, CA 93105, USA.
J Med Philos. 2010 Aug;35(4):396-401. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhq030. Epub 2010 Jul 11.
In this article I show that the argument in John Harris's famous "Survival Lottery" paper cannot be right. Even if we grant Harris's assumptions--of the justifiability of such a lottery, the correctness of maximizing consequentialism, the indistinguishability between killing and letting die, the practical and political feasibility of such a scheme--the argument still will not yield the conclusion that Harris wants. On his own terms, the medically needy should be less favored (and more vulnerable to being killed), than Harris suggests.
在本文中，我指出约翰·哈里斯著名的《生存彩票》一文中的论证不可能是正确的。即便我们认可哈里斯的假设——这种彩票的合理性、最大化后果主义的正确性、杀人与任其死亡之间的不可区分性、该方案在实践和政治上的可行性——该论证仍无法得出哈里斯想要的结论。按照他自己的说法，医疗需求者应比哈里斯所建议的更不受青睐（且更容易被杀害）。
