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[保罗 - 约瑟夫·巴尔泰兹(1734 - 1806)的活力论]

[The vitalism of Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734-1806)].

作者信息

Han Hee Jin

机构信息

Institute of Humanities, Seoul National University, Gwanak-gu Seoul 151-745, Korea.

出版信息

Uisahak. 2010 Jun 30;19(1):157-88.

Abstract

In The Logic of Life (1970), Francois Jacob (1920- ), Nobel Prize laureate in Physiology or Medicine (1965), proclaimed the end of vitalism based on the concept of life. More than two decades before this capital sentence condemning vitalism was pronounced, Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995), a French philosopher of medicine, already acknowledged that eighteenth-century vitalism was scientifically retrograde and politically reactionary or counter-revolutionary insofar as it was rooted in the animism of Georg Ernst Stahl (1660-1734). The negative preconception of the term 'vitalism' came to be established as an orthodox view, since Claude Bernard (1813-1878) unfairly criticized contemporary vitalism in order to propagate his idea of experimental medicine. An eminent evolutionary biologist like Ernst Mayr (1904-2005) still defended similar views in This is Biology (1997), arguing that if vitalists were decisive and convincing in their rejection of the Cartesian model (negative heuristics), however they were equally indecisive and unconvincing in their own explanatory endeavors (positive heuristics). Historically speaking, vitalists came to the forefront for their outstanding criticism of Cartesian mechanism and physicochemical reductionism, while their innovative concepts and theories were underestimated and received much less attention. Is it true that vitalism was merely a pseudo-science, representing a kind of romanticism or mysticism in biomedical science? Did vitalists lack any positive heuristics in their biomedical research? Above all, what was actually the so.called 'vitalism'? This paper aims to reveal the positive heuristics of vitalism defined by Paul.Joseph Barthez (1734-1806) who was the founder of the vitalist school of Montpellier. To this end, his work and idea are introduced with regard to the vying doctrines in physiology and medicine. At the moment when he taught at the medical school of Montpellier, his colleagues advocated the mechanism of Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the iatromechanism of Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738), the iatrochemistry of Jan Baptist van Helmont (1579-1644), the animism of Stahl, and the organicism of Theophile de Bordeu (1722-1776). On the contrary, Barthez devoted himself to synthesize diverse doctrines and his vitalism consequently illustrated an eclectic character. Always taking a skeptical standpoint regarding the capacity of biomedical science, he defined his famous concept of 'vital principle (principe vital)' as the 'x (unknown variable)' of physiology. He argued that the hypothetical concept of vital principle referred to the 'experimental cause (cause experimentale)' verifiable by positive science. Thus, the vital principle was not presupposed as an a priori regulative principle. It was an a posteriori heuristic principle resulting from several experiments. The 'positivist hypothetism' of Barthez demonstrates not only pragmatism but also positivism in his scientific terminology. Furthermore, Barthez established a guideline for clinical practice according to his own methodological principles. It can be characterized as a 'humanist pragmatism' for the reason that all sort of treatments were permitted as far as they were beneficial to the patient. Theoretical incoherence or incommensurability among different treatments did not matter to Barthez. His practical strategy for clinical medicine consisted of three principles: namely, the natural, analytic, and empirical method. This formulation is indebted to the 'analytic method (methode analytique)' of the French empiricist philosopher Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-1780). In conclusion, the eighteenth.century French vitalism conceived by Barthez pursued pragmatism in general, positivism in methodology, and humanism in clinics.

摘要

在《生命的逻辑》(1970年)一书中,诺贝尔生理学或医学奖得主(1965年)弗朗索瓦·雅各布(1920年 - )宣称基于生命概念的活力论已终结。在这句宣判活力论死刑的话说出的二十多年前,法国医学哲学家乔治·康吉莱姆(1904年 - 1995年)就已承认,18世纪的活力论在科学上是倒退的,在政治上是反动的或反革命的,因为它植根于格奥尔格·恩斯特·施塔尔(1660年 - 1734年)的泛灵论。“活力论”一词的负面先入之见成为了正统观点,因为克洛德·贝尔纳(1813年 - )为宣传他的实验医学理念而不公正地批评了当代活力论。像恩斯特·迈尔(1904年 - 2005年)这样杰出的进化生物学家在《这就是生物学》(1997年)中仍捍卫类似观点,认为活力论者在拒绝笛卡尔模型(负面启发法)时果断且有说服力,但在他们自己的解释性努力(正面启发法)中同样犹豫不决且缺乏说服力。从历史角度看,活力论者因对笛卡尔机制和物理化学还原论的出色批判而崭露头角,而他们的创新概念和理论却被低估且很少受到关注。活力论仅仅是一种伪科学,代表生物医学科学中的一种浪漫主义或神秘主义吗?活力论者在他们的生物医学研究中缺乏任何正面启发法吗?最重要的是,所谓的“活力论”究竟是什么?本文旨在揭示由蒙彼利埃活力论学派创始人保罗·约瑟夫·巴泰兹(1734年 - 1806年)所定义的活力论的正面启发法。为此,将结合生理学和医学中的竞争学说来介绍他的作品和思想。在他于蒙彼利埃医学院任教时,他的同事们主张勒内·笛卡尔(1596年 - 1650年)的机制、赫尔曼·布尔哈夫(1668年 - 1738年)的医力学、扬·巴普蒂斯特·范·海尔蒙特(1579年 - 1644年)的医化学、施塔尔的泛灵论以及西奥菲勒·德·博尔代(1722年 - 1776年)的有机论。相反,巴泰兹致力于综合各种学说,因此他的活力论具有折衷主义特征。他总是对生物医学科学的能力持怀疑态度,将他著名 的“活力原则(principe vital)”概念定义为生理学的“x(未知变量)”。他认为活力原则的假设概念指的是可由实证科学验证的“实验原因(cause experimentale)”。因此,活力原则并非被预设为一个先验的调节性原则。它是经过多次实验得出的后验启发法原则。巴泰兹的“实证主义假设论”在他的科学术语中不仅体现了实用主义,还体现了实证主义。此外,巴泰兹根据他自己的方法论原则确立了临床实践指南。它可以被描述为一种“人文主义实用主义”,因为只要对患者有益,各种治疗方法都被允许。不同治疗方法之间的理论不一致或不可通约性对巴泰兹来说并不重要。他的临床医学实践策略包括三个原则:即自然、分析和经验方法。这种表述得益于法国经验主义哲学家埃蒂安·博诺·德·孔狄亚克(1714年 - 1780年)的“分析方法(methode analytique)”。总之,巴泰兹所构想的18世纪法国活力论总体上追求实用主义,在方法论上追求实证主义,在临床实践中追求人文主义。

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