Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institut für Philosophie, GA3/141, Universitätsstraße 150, D-44780 Bochum, Germany.
Conscious Cogn. 2010 Sep;19(3):731-44. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.06.019. Epub 2010 Aug 23.
Self-deception is a special kind of motivational dominance in belief-formation. We develop criteria which set paradigmatic self-deception apart from related phenomena of auto-manipulation such as pretense and motivational bias. In self-deception rational subjects defend or develop beliefs of high subjective importance in response to strong counter-evidence. Self-deceivers make or keep these beliefs tenable by putting prima-facie rational defense-strategies to work against their established standards of rational evaluation. In paradigmatic self-deception, target-beliefs are made tenable via reorganizations of those belief-sets that relate relevant data to target-beliefs. This manipulation of the evidential value of relevant data goes beyond phenomena of motivated perception of data. In self-deception belief-defense is pseudo-rational. Self-deceivers will typically apply a dual standard of evaluation that remains intransparent to the subject. The developed model of self-deception as pseudo-rational belief-defense is empirically anchored. So, we hope to put forward a promising candidate.
自欺是信念形成中一种特殊的动机优势。我们制定了一些标准,将范式自欺与相关的自我操纵现象区分开来,如伪装和动机偏差。在自欺中,理性主体会为了维护高度主观重要性的信念而对强烈的反证进行辩护或发展。自欺者通过将初步理性的防御策略应用于其既定的理性评估标准,使这些信念得以维持。在范式自欺中,目标信念通过对与目标信念相关的信念集进行重新组织而得以维持。这种对相关数据的证据价值的操纵超出了受动机影响的数据感知现象。在自欺中,信念防御是伪理性的。自欺者通常会应用双重评估标准,而这种标准对主体来说是不透明的。我们提出的作为伪理性信念防御的自欺模型具有经验基础。因此,我们希望提出一个有前途的候选模型。