Szabó György, Szolnoki Attila, Varga Melinda, Hanusovszky Lívia
Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, Budapest, Hungary.
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys. 2010 Aug;82(2 Pt 2):026110. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.82.026110. Epub 2010 Aug 19.
Evolutionary 2×2 games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability dependent on the difference of their summed payoffs between the final and initial states assuming quenched strategies in their neighborhood. In the case of the anticoordination game this system behaves like an antiferromagnetic kinetic Ising model. Within a wide region of social dilemmas this dynamical rule supports the formation of similar spatial arrangement of the cooperators and defectors ensuring the optimum total payoff if the temptation to choose defection exceeds a threshold value dependent on the sucker's payoff. The comparison of the results with those achieved for pairwise imitation and myopic strategy updates has indicated the relevant advantage of pairwise collective strategy update in the maintenance of cooperation.
研究了位于正方形晶格上的参与者的进化2×2博弈。在进化过程中，随机选择的相邻参与者试图通过采用随机策略对来最大化他们的集体收益，采用该策略对的概率取决于他们在假定其邻域策略固定的情况下最终和初始状态之间总收益的差异。在反协调博弈的情况下，该系统的行为类似于反铁磁动力学伊辛模型。在广泛的社会困境区域内，如果选择背叛的诱惑超过取决于受骗者收益的阈值，则这种动态规则支持合作者和背叛者形成类似的空间排列，从而确保最佳总收益。将结果与通过成对模仿和近视策略更新所获得的结果进行比较，表明成对集体策略更新在维持合作方面具有相关优势。
