University of Johannesburg – Philosophy, P.O. Box 524, Auckland Park, 2006, South
Dev World Bioeth. 2010 Dec;10(3):158-63. doi: 10.1111/j.1471-8847.2010.00289.x.
In a prior issue of Developing World Bioethics, Cheryl Macpherson and Ruth Macklin critically engaged with an article of mine, where I articulated a moral theory grounded on indigenous values salient in the sub-Saharan region, and then applied it to four major issues in bioethics, comparing and contrasting its implications with those of the dominant Western moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism. In response to my essay, Macpherson and Macklin have posed questions about: whether philosophical justifications are something with which bioethicists ought to be concerned; why something counts as 'African'; how medicine is a moral enterprise; whether an individual right to informed consent is consistent with sub-Saharan values; and when thought experiments help to establish firm conclusions about moral status. These are important issues for the field, and I use this reply to take discussion of them a step or two farther, defending my initial article from Macpherson's and Macklin's critical questions and objections.
在《发展中世界生物伦理学》的前一期中，Cheryl Macpherson 和 Ruth Macklin 对我发表的一篇文章进行了批判性的探讨，我在文章中阐述了一种基于在撒哈拉以南地区有明显影响的本土价值观的道德理论，然后将其应用于生物伦理学的四个主要问题，比较和对比其含义与功利主义和康德主义等主流西方道德理论的含义。针对我的文章，Macpherson 和 Macklin 提出了一些问题，涉及：生物伦理学家是否应该关注哲学论证；为什么某些东西被认为是“非洲的”；医学如何成为一种道德事业；知情同意的个人权利是否符合撒哈拉以南地区的价值观；以及思想实验在确立道德地位方面的帮助。这些问题对于该领域很重要，我在这篇回复中进一步讨论了这些问题，从 Macpherson 和 Macklin 的批评性问题和反对意见出发，为我的初始文章进行了辩护。
