School of Business, The George Washington University, 2201 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20052, USA.
J Appl Psychol. 2011 May;96(3):457-69. doi: 10.1037/a0021654.
Using tournament theory as a guiding theoretical framework, in this study, we assess the organizational implications of pay dispersion and other pay system characteristics on the likelihood of turnover among individual executives in organizational teams. Specifically, we estimate the effect of these pay system characteristics on executive turnover decisions. We use a multi-industry, multilevel data set composed of executives in publicly held firms to assess the effects of pay dispersion at the individual level. Consistent with previous findings, we find that pay dispersion is associated with an increased likelihood of executive turnover. In addition, we find that other pay characteristics also affect turnover, both directly and through a moderating effect on pay dispersion. Turnover is more likely when executives receive lower portions of overall top management team compensation and when they have more pay at risk. These conditions also moderate the relationship between pay dispersion and individual turnover decisions, as does receiving lower compensation relative to the market.
本文运用锦标赛理论作为指导理论框架，评估薪酬差距和其他薪酬体系特征对组织团队中个体高管离职可能性的组织含义。具体而言，我们估计了这些薪酬体系特征对高管离职决策的影响。我们使用由上市公司高管组成的多行业、多层次数据集来评估个体层面薪酬差距的影响。与先前的研究结果一致，我们发现薪酬差距与高管离职的可能性增加有关。此外，我们还发现其他薪酬特征也会通过对薪酬差距的调节作用直接或间接地影响离职。当高管获得的整体高层管理团队薪酬比例较低，薪酬风险较高时，他们离职的可能性更大。这些情况也会调节薪酬差距与个体离职决策之间的关系，相对于市场获得较低薪酬也会产生同样的效果。
