Sensory-motor interference abolishes repetition priming for observed actions, but not for action-related verbs.

Several studies on humans have shown a recruitment of the sensory-motor system in the perception of action-related visual and verbal material, suggesting that actions are represented through sensory-motor processes. To date, these studies have not disentangled whether such a recruitment is epiphenomenal or necessary to action representation. Here we took advantage of repetition priming as a tool to investigate the cognitive representation of actions, and systematically looked whether a concurrent motor or verbal task had a detrimental effect on this representation. In a first experiment participants discriminated images depicting meaningless and meaningful actions, while performing either a concurrent sensory-motor or an articulatory suppression task. Images were classified as depicting a repeated or a new action, relative to the previous image in the trial series. We found a facilitation by repetition priming, that was unaffected by the articulatory task but was completely abolished by the sensory-motor task. In a second experiment, we investigated whether the sensory-motor system is also causally involved in processing action-related verbs. In this experiment actions were presented as written infinitive verbs rather than as images. The facilitation by repetition priming was again unaffected by the concurrent articulatory task, while the sensory-motor concurrent task, although reducing the facilitation, did not abolish it. Our data provide evidence that the sensory-motor system is differentially involved during visual processing of actions and during processing of action-related verbs. Results are discussed within the theoretical frame of embodied cognition.