University of Hertfordshire, Department of Philosophy, de Havilland Campus, Hatfield AL 10 9AB, UK.
Conscious Cogn. 2012 Jun;21(2):742-6. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.007. Epub 2011 Apr 2.
A zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of ghosts, are somewhat neglected. In this paper I argue that ghostly arguments have a number of dialectical advantages over zombie arguments. I go onto explain how the conceivability of ghosts is inconsistent with two kinds of a priori physicalism: analytic functionalism and the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis.
僵尸是人类的物理复制品，缺乏意识。幽灵是人类的现象学复制品，其本质被意识耗尽。僵尸论点的讨论，即诉诸僵尸的可想象性的反物理主义论点，在心灵哲学文献中是熟悉的，而幽灵论点，即诉诸幽灵的可想象性的反物理主义论点，则有些被忽视。在本文中，我认为幽灵论点比僵尸论点具有许多辩证上的优势。我接着解释了幽灵的可想象性如何与两种先验物理主义：分析功能主义和阿姆斯特朗和刘易斯的澳大利亚物理主义不一致。
