Ohio State University, Department of Psychology, Columbus, OH 43210, USA.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2011 May;37(5):714-26. doi: 10.1177/0146167211400207.
It is often assumed, by laypeople and researchers alike, that people shift visual perspective in mental images of life events to maintain a positive self-concept by claiming ownership of desirable events (first-person) and disowning undesirable events (third-person). The present research suggests that people shift perspective not according to the pictured event's desirability but according to whether they focus on the experience of the event (first-person) or on the event's coherence with the self-concept (third-person). This explains why self-change promotes third-person imagery of prechange selves (Studies 1 and 2). And, the same mechanism determines perspective apart from self-change, in both memory and imagination (Studies 3 and 4). By demonstrating that people shift perspective according to whether they focus on the experience of an event or its self-concept coherence, these results suggest how perspective may function more broadly in social cognition, and specifically in the construction and maintenance of the temporally extended self.
人们通常认为，无论是外行人还是研究人员，人们在生活事件的心理图像中转换视角，通过声称拥有理想的事件（第一人称）和否认不想要的事件（第三人称）来维持积极的自我概念。本研究表明，人们转换视角不是根据所描绘事件的可取性，而是根据他们关注事件的体验（第一人称）还是事件与自我概念的一致性（第三人称）。这解释了为什么自我改变会促进对改变前自我的第三人称形象的想象（研究 1 和 2）。而且，相同的机制除了自我改变之外，在记忆和想象中（研究 3 和 4）也决定了视角。通过证明人们根据自己是关注事件的体验还是其与自我概念的一致性来转换视角，这些结果表明视角如何在社会认知中更广泛地发挥作用，特别是在时间延伸自我的构建和维持方面。
