Misceo Giovanni F, Taylor Nathanael J
Department of Psychology, Benedictine College, Atchison, KS, USA.
Exp Psychol. 2011;58(5):385-90. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000107.
An account of intersensory integration is premised on knowing that different sensory inputs arise from the same object. Could, however, the combination of the inputs be impaired although the "unity assumption" holds? Forty observers viewed a square through a minifying (50%) lens while they simultaneously touched the square. Half could see and half could not see their haptic explorations of the square. Both groups, however, had reason to believe that they were touching and viewing the same square. Subsequent matches of the inspected square were mutually biased by touch and vision when the exploratory movements were visible. However, the matches were biased in the direction of the square's haptic size when observers could not see their exploratory movements. This impaired integration without the visible haptic explorations suggests that the unity assumption alone is not enough to promote intersensory integration.
对跨感觉通道整合的一种解释是基于这样的认识,即不同的感觉输入来自同一个物体。然而,尽管“统一假设”成立,输入的组合是否会受到损害呢?40名观察者通过缩小(50%)的透镜观察一个正方形,同时触摸这个正方形。其中一半人能看到,另一半人看不到他们对正方形的触觉探索。然而,两组人都有理由相信他们触摸和观察的是同一个正方形。当探索动作可见时,随后对被检查正方形的匹配在触觉和视觉上相互产生偏差。然而,当观察者看不到他们的探索动作时,匹配结果偏向于正方形的触觉大小。在没有可见触觉探索的情况下这种受损的整合表明,仅靠统一假设不足以促进跨感觉通道整合。