Suppr超能文献

嫉妒是慈善事业可能的进化根源之一吗?

Is envy one of the possible evolutionary roots of charity?

作者信息

Garay József, Móri Tamás F

机构信息

Research Group of Theoretical Biology and Ecology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and L. Eötvös University, Department of Plant Taxonomy and Ecology, Budapest, Hungary.

出版信息

Biosystems. 2011 Oct;106(1):28-35. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2011.06.004. Epub 2011 Jul 8.

Abstract

We introduce an evolutionary game in which envy and charity can be considered as a consequence of Darwinian competition, i.e. individuals aim at increasing their own proportion rather than their absolute contribution to the next generation, and other-regarding-preference is a "method" for that. If the damage is additive and its cost is low, an envious strategy defeats a neutral strategy (rational strategy maximizing its own income). If damage is multiplicative, then coexistence of neutral and envious strategists is possible. Envy is a conditional spiteful strategy, thus in envious groups there is less damage than in spiteful groups, so envy decreases the total cost of spiteful competition. Although envy can be selected out in a mixed population of envious, neutral and spiteful individuals when damage is additive, the envious-spiteful strategists (envious within its kin and spiteful outside its kin) outperform neutral and spiteful ones in a simple kin-selection scenario. Furthermore, Clytemnestra's strategy, namely donating to richer people to evokes envious attacks on them, can spread through an envious group. Moreover, the envious-donator strategy (giving to the poorest and damaging the richer individuals) can spread in the envious group. Charity is a "buy-off" behaviour, since the donator can decrease its own damage from envy, thus charity further decreases the total cost of spiteful competition.

摘要

我们引入了一种进化博弈,其中嫉妒和慈善可被视为达尔文式竞争的结果,即个体旨在提高自己在下一代中的比例,而非其对下一代的绝对贡献,而关心他人的偏好是实现这一目标的“手段”。如果损害是累加性的且成本较低,嫉妒策略会击败中性策略(即最大化自身收益的理性策略)。如果损害是相乘性的,那么中性策略者和嫉妒策略者有可能共存。嫉妒是一种有条件的恶意策略,因此在嫉妒群体中,损害比恶意群体中的要少,所以嫉妒降低了恶意竞争的总成本。尽管当损害是累加性时,在由嫉妒、中性和恶意个体组成的混合群体中,嫉妒可能会被淘汰,但在简单的亲缘选择情境中,嫉妒 - 恶意策略者(在亲属内部表现为嫉妒,在亲属外部表现为恶意)的表现优于中性和恶意策略者。此外,克莱泰涅斯特拉的策略,即向更富有的人捐赠以引发对他们的嫉妒攻击,能够在嫉妒群体中传播。而且,嫉妒 - 捐赠者策略(给予最贫穷的人并损害更富有的人)也能在嫉妒群体中传播。慈善是一种“收买”行为,因为捐赠者可以减少自身因嫉妒而遭受的损害,因此慈善进一步降低了恶意竞争的总成本。

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验