Vasalou Sophia
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, UK.
Arab Sci Philos. 2007;17(2):267-98.
In this paper, my aim is to offer some comment on the study of Mu'tazilite kalām, framed around the study of a particular episode in the Mu'tazilite dispute about man ('mā huwa al-insān') -- a question with a deceptively Aristotelian cadence that is not too difficult to dispel. Within this episode, my focus is on one of the major arguments used by the late Basrans to hold up their side of the dispute (a side heavily indebted to Abū Hāshim's ontological innovations), and on the relationship between the mental and the physical (or the subjective and objective) which emerges from it. The most interesting -- and most surprising -- aspect of this relationship is that the mental and the physical do not seem to be treated as distinct terms, thus creating the space for questions about how the two relate. The first person perspective seems to be identified with the physical body. My interest then is in the response of the reader to this surprising presentation -- or rather, in a certain kind of reader response, and thus a certain kind of interpretive mode, whose value and viability it is part of my aim to help clarify.
在本文中，我的目的是围绕穆尔太齐赖派关于“人是什么”（'mā huwa al-insān'）的争论中的一个特定事件，对穆尔太齐赖派教义学的研究发表一些评论。这个问题有着看似亚里士多德式的韵律，但并不难消除。在这个事件中，我关注的是巴士拉后期学者用来支持他们在争论中立场的一个主要论点（这一立场在很大程度上得益于阿布·哈希姆的本体论创新），以及由此产生的心理与物理（或主观与客观）之间的关系。这种关系最有趣——也最令人惊讶——的方面是，心理和物理似乎并没有被视为不同的概念，从而为两者如何关联的问题留出了空间。第一人称视角似乎与物理身体等同。我感兴趣的是读者对这种惊人表述的反应——或者更确切地说，是某种读者反应，以及由此产生的某种解释模式，我旨在帮助阐明其价值和可行性。
