Furberg Elisabeth
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden.
J Med Philos. 2012 Feb;37(1):60-73. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhr055. Epub 2011 Dec 20.
The personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person's advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal identity problem, often consider it to be a very potent objection to the use of advance directives. Aiming to question this assumption, I, in this paper, discuss the personal identity problem's relevance to the moral force of advance directives. By putting the personal identity argument in relation to two different normative frameworks, I aim to show that whether or not the personal identity problem is relevant to the moral force of advance directives, and further, in what way it is relevant, depends entirely on what normative reasons we have for respecting advance directives in the first place.
由于心理连续性被打乱，一个人的预先指示可能会被用来决定另一个人的护理。即使是那些强烈质疑个人身份问题支持者所描述情景可能性的伦理学家，也常常认为这是对使用预先指示的一个非常有力的反对理由。为了质疑这一假设，在本文中，我将讨论个人身份问题与预先指示道德效力的相关性。通过将个人身份论证与两个不同的规范框架联系起来，我旨在表明，个人身份问题是否与预先指示的道德效力相关，以及进一步说，它以何种方式相关，完全取决于我们最初尊重预先指示的规范性理由是什么。
