Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester.
Top Cogn Sci. 2012 Jan;4(1):84-6; discussion 94-102. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01174.x.
Stephen and Van Orden (this issue) propose that there is a complex system approach to cognitive science, and collectively the authors of the papers presented in this issue believe that this approach provides the means to drive a revolution in the science of the mind. Unfortunately, however illuminating, this explanation is absent and hyperbole is all too extensive. In contrast, I argue (1) that dynamic systems theory is not new to cognitive science and does not provide a basis for a revolution, (2) it is not necessary to reject cognitive science in order to explain the constraints imposed by the body and the environment, (3) it is not necessary, as Silberstein and Chemero (this issue) appear to do, to reject cognitive science in order to explain consciousness, and (4) our understanding of pragmatics is not advanced by Gibbs and Van Orden's (this issue) "self-organized criticality".? Any debate about the future of cognitive science could usefully focus on predictive adequacy. Unfortunately, this is not the approach taken by the authors of this issue.
斯蒂芬和范奥登（本期）提出认知科学存在一种复杂系统方法，本期中呈现的论文的作者共同相信，这种方法提供了驱动心智科学革命的手段。然而，不幸的是，这种解释虽有启发性但却缺失了，而且言过其实的情况太过广泛。相比之下，我认为（1）动态系统理论对于认知科学来说并不新鲜，也不能为革命提供基础，（2）为了解释身体和环境的限制，没有必要拒绝认知科学，（3）没有必要像西尔伯斯坦和切梅罗（本期）那样为了解释意识而拒绝认知科学，以及（4）我们对语用学的理解并没有因为吉布斯和范奥登（本期）的“自组织临界性”而得到推进。关于认知科学的未来的任何辩论都可以集中在预测充分性上。不幸的是，本期的作者并没有采取这种方法。
