Wieland Wolfgang
Acta Hist Leopoldina. 2011(57):99-130.
To further the enlightenment primarily or even only by means of science was the hope of most representatives of the movement of the enlightenment which gave its name to a whole period of European cultural history. Only a few of its representatives, like Montesquieu and Rousseau, doubted for good reasons, whether and how the goals of the enlightenment can be reached at all by the means of science alone. In his Discours préliminaires to the Encyclopédie D'Alembert still wanted to limit science proper to the narrower field of those kinds of research which were strictly based on observations and calculations alone. In this way he remained committed to Descartes' ideal method of receiving authentic knowledge only by deduction from evident axioms or fundamental theorems. Pascal's casual discovery of the calculation of probabilities allowed to apply mathematics on the hidden laws of the apparent casualties of the human life world. Bacon's project of empirical science as a rational and methodological art of conducting experiments could replace the methodological ideal of science more geometrico. Lichtenberg's refined sensibility for the subjunctive linguistic forms of hypothetical thinking indicates a new understanding of inventing and testing hypotheses as the two most important methods of the experimental sciences when compared to the formal sciences of logic and mathematics. Whoever is studying the history of science of modern times in the cross wire of the enlightenment, will realize soon that science has always been in need of being illuminated about its own chances, risks and side effects. The project of enlightenment through science had to be complemented by the project of an enlightenment about science right from its beginning. Because of the implicit risks and side effects the project of enlightenment has to be enlightenment despite of science and because of science. On the one hand, as a special form of human practice the sciences are directed towards theoretical goals and practical purposes such that their agents cannot be conscious of all aspects of their practices in advance and reflect about all of them at the same time. On the other hand, the agents of such scientific practices are rarely trained, to analyze the cognitive implications of their own actions with the conceptual means of philosophical analysis. Furthermore, the agents of scientific research are hardly able to foresee the theoretical results of their research or even predict the chances and risks of eventual applications with the methods of the social sciences. Despite of the chastening experiences with the ambivalence of the theoretical results and practical applications of the modern sciences and despite of the illuminating effects of modern history and theory of science, contemporary scientists are not fully conscious yet of what they are really doing and what science really is. The contemplative ideal of scientific investigations for their own sake has been replaced in modern times by the practical ideal of scientific research in the service of humanity. The emancipation of the modem sciences from philosophical authorities and religious institutions has freed at first the sciences from alien restrictions to their self-chosen objects and purposes of research. However, the increasing economic constraints and the political dependences prevented even more so that scientists could realize the autonomy which the representatives of the enlightenment had been hoping for. KANT defined the goal of enlightenment as "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity". Quoting HORACE'S Sapere aude! he appealed to the courage of his comrades to use their own reason without the guidance of others in philosophical and especially in religious matters. Intellectual maturity as the proper goal of the enlightenment remained to be an undelivered promise despite of the emancipation of the sciences from traditional philosophical authorities and religious institutions. It is not only arguable whether or not enlightenment in this understanding is possible for most people, but also whether it is even desirable for all people considering the implicit ambivalence of the modern sciences. Kant's main philosophical works can be adequately interpreted as the first and unique attempt to understand the potential of the cognitive capacities of human beings about the chances and risks of enlightenment itself by means of a critical inquiry. This holds especially for the practical fruits of the enlightenment as, e.g., with respect to the emancipation from superstition and the appeal to religious tolerance, to the republican idea of the state and the establishment of civil and human rights, to the humanization of the law and execution of legal penalty as well as the unalienable rights of each individual human being.
借助科学来推进启蒙,这主要甚至仅仅是启蒙运动大多数代表人物的希望,正是这场运动为欧洲文化史的整整一个时期赋予了名称。只有少数代表人物,如孟德斯鸠和卢梭,出于充分的理由怀疑,仅凭科学手段能否以及如何实现启蒙运动的目标。在他为《百科全书》撰写的《绪论》中,达朗贝尔仍想将真正的科学局限于那些严格基于观察和计算的较窄研究领域。这样,他就依然秉持笛卡尔的理想方法,即仅通过从明显的公理或基本定理进行推导来获取确凿知识。帕斯卡偶然发现的概率计算方法使得数学能够应用于人类生命世界表面偶然现象背后的隐藏规律。培根将经验科学作为一种理性且具有方法论的实验艺术的构想,能够取代几何学意义上的科学方法论理想。与逻辑和数学这些形式科学相比,利希滕贝格对假设性思维的虚拟语言形式的敏锐感知,表明了对发明和检验假设这两种实验科学最重要方法的一种新理解。任何在启蒙运动的交叉视野中研究近代科学史的人,很快就会意识到,科学一直需要有人阐明其自身的机遇、风险和副作用。从一开始,通过科学实现启蒙的计划就必须辅之以关于科学的启蒙计划。由于启蒙运动存在潜在风险和副作用,它必须既是摆脱科学的启蒙,又是借助科学的启蒙。一方面,作为人类实践的一种特殊形式,科学指向理论目标和实际目的,以至于其从业者无法预先意识到其实践的所有方面,也无法同时对所有方面进行反思。另一方面,这种科学实践的从业者很少接受过用哲学分析的概念手段来分析其自身行动的认知影响的训练。此外,科研人员几乎无法用社会科学的方法预见其研究的理论结果,甚至无法预测最终应用的机遇和风险。尽管有现代科学理论结果和实际应用的矛盾所带来的惨痛教训,尽管有现代科学史和科学理论的启示作用,但当代科学家尚未充分意识到他们实际上在做什么以及科学究竟是什么。为科学本身而进行的沉思性科学探究理想,在现代已被服务于人类的科学研究的实践理想所取代。现代科学从哲学权威和宗教机构中解放出来,起初使科学摆脱了对其自行选择的研究对象和目的的外来限制。然而,日益增加的经济限制和政治依赖更使得科学家难以实现启蒙运动代表人物所期望的自主性。康德将启蒙的目标定义为“人类从自我招致的不成熟状态中走出来”。他引用贺拉斯的“敢于求知!”,呼吁他的同仁们在哲学尤其是宗教事务中,要有勇气在没有他人指导的情况下运用自己的理性。尽管科学从传统哲学权威和宗教机构中解放出来,但作为启蒙恰当目标的智力成熟仍然是一个尚未兑现的承诺。不仅大多数人是否有可能实现这种意义上的启蒙值得商榷,而且考虑到现代科学潜在的矛盾性,所有人是否都渴望这种启蒙也值得怀疑。康德的主要哲学著作可以被恰当地解释为通过批判性探究来理解人类认知能力关于启蒙本身的机遇和风险的潜力的首次也是唯一的尝试。这尤其适用于启蒙运动的实际成果,例如,在摆脱迷信和倡导宗教宽容方面,在国家的共和理念以及公民权利和人权的确立方面,在法律的人性化和刑罚的执行方面,以及在每个人不可剥夺的权利方面。