BRiDGE, Foundations of Economic Analysis I, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), E-48015 Bilbao, Spain.
J Theor Biol. 2012 Jul 21;305:110-7. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.034. Epub 2012 Apr 5.
In this paper we consider the hawk-dove game played by a finite population formed by two types of individual who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies and show that in each of them one type of individuals suffers more aggression than the other. When a continuum of individuals is considered there are no evolutionarily stable strategies but neutrally stable strategies.
在本文中，我们考虑了由两种类型的个体组成的有限群体所玩的鹰鸽博弈，这些个体无法识别自己的类型，但可以观察到对手的类型。在这个博弈中，我们发现了两个进化稳定策略，并表明在每个策略中，一种类型的个体比另一种类型的个体遭受更多的攻击。当考虑连续的个体时，没有进化稳定策略，但存在中性稳定策略。
