Department of Medicine, University of Tennessee Health Science Center, 956 Court Avenue, Suite G212, Memphis, Tennessee 38163, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2012 Sep;38(9):567-9. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2011-100419. Epub 2012 Apr 13.
In an earlier essay in this journal I critiqued Don Marquis's well-known argument against abortion. I distinguished two versions of Marquis's argument, which I refer to as 'the essence argument' and 'the sufficient condition argument'. I presented two counterexamples showing that the essence argument was mistaken, and I argued that the sufficient condition argument should be rejected because Marquis had not adequately responded to an important objection to it. In response to my critique, Marquis put forward in this journal a revised version of his argument. In his modified approach he no longer advocates the essence argument and he offers a new version of the sufficient condition argument. In the current essay, I discuss how Marquis's revised argument deals with my original objections, and I argue that his new sufficient condition argument is unsuccessful.
在本期刊的一篇早期文章中，我批评了唐·马奎斯（Don Marquis）著名的反对堕胎的论点。我区分了马奎斯论点的两个版本，我称之为“本质论点”和“充分条件论点”。我提出了两个反例，表明本质论点是错误的，并且我认为充分条件论点应该被拒绝，因为马奎斯没有充分回应对它的一个重要反对意见。针对我的批评，马奎斯在本期刊上提出了他论点的修订版。在他修改后的方法中，他不再提倡本质论点，而是提出了充分条件论点的新版本。在当前的文章中，我讨论了马奎斯修订后的论点如何处理我最初的反对意见，并且我认为他的新的充分条件论点是不成功的。
