Roth A E
University of Pittsburgh, PA 15260.
Science. 1990 Dec 14;250(4987):1524-8. doi: 10.1126/science.2274783.
The National Resident Matching Program is a centralized clearinghouse through which new medical graduates in the United States obtain their first positions. The history of this market, from the market failures that the centralized system was designed to address, to the present, is discussed, and a hypothesis about the behavior of such markets is presented. New evidence is then presented from a set of similar centralized markets in the United Kingdom. Because some of these latter markets have failed, while others have succeeded, they provide a natural experiment that permits the hypothesis to be tested. The new evidence also suggests directions in which modifications of existing procedures might be considered.
美国国家住院医师匹配计划是一个集中清算机构，美国的新医学毕业生通过该机构获得他们的首个职位。本文讨论了这个市场的历史，从设计集中系统以解决的市场失灵到现在，并提出了关于此类市场行为的一个假设。然后展示了来自英国一组类似集中市场的新证据。由于这些后一类市场中的一些失败了，而另一些成功了，它们提供了一个自然实验，使得该假设能够得到检验。新证据还表明了现有程序可能需要考虑修改的方向。
