Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17604-3003, USA.
Top Cogn Sci. 2012 Oct;4(4):717-30. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01211.x. Epub 2012 Jul 9.
To accept that cognition is embodied is to question many of the beliefs traditionally held by cognitive scientists. One key question regards the localization of cognitive faculties. Here we argue that for cognition to be embodied and sometimes embedded, means that the cognitive faculty cannot be localized in a brain area alone. We review recent research on neural reuse, the 1/f structure of human activity, tool use, group cognition, and social coordination dynamics that we believe demonstrates how the boundary between the different areas of the brain, the brain and body, and the body and environment is not only blurred but indeterminate. In turn, we propose that cognition is supported by a nested structure of task-specific synergies, which are softly assembled from a variety of neural, bodily, and environmental components (including other individuals), and exhibit interaction dominant dynamics.
接受认知具有体现性，就意味着要质疑认知科学家们长期秉持的许多观念。其中一个关键问题是认知能力的定位。我们认为，认知如果具有体现性和（有时）嵌入性，就意味着认知能力不能仅定位在大脑的某个区域。我们回顾了关于神经再利用、人类活动的 1/f 结构、工具使用、群体认知和社会协调动态的最新研究，我们相信这些研究表明了大脑不同区域之间、大脑与身体之间以及身体与环境之间的界限不仅是模糊的，而且是不确定的。反过来，我们提出认知是由特定任务的协同作用的嵌套结构来支持的，这些协同作用是由各种神经、身体和环境组件（包括其他个体）软组合而成的，并表现出交互主导的动态。
