Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA.
J Biol Dyn. 2009 Jul;3(4):357-75. doi: 10.1080/17513750802344246.
The dynamics of an epidemic model with voluntary vaccinations are studied. Individual vaccination decisions are modelled using an economic/game-theoretic approach: agents in the model decide whether to vaccinate or not by weighing the cost and benefit of vaccination and choose the action that maximizes their net benefit. It is shown that, when vaccine efficacy is low, there are parameter values for which multiple steady-state equilibria and periodic equilibria coexist. When multiplicity of steady states is obtained, which one the population reaches in some cases depends entirely on agents' expectations concerning the future course of an epidemic and not on the initial conditions of the model. (†)Comments and suggestions from anonymous referees of the journal are gratefully acknowledged. This paper is dedicated to the loving memory of Lucy Hauser.
研究了具有自愿接种疫苗的传染病模型的动力学。个体接种决策通过经济/博弈论方法进行建模：模型中的代理通过权衡接种的成本和收益来决定是否接种，并选择使他们的净收益最大化的行动。结果表明，当疫苗效力较低时，存在一些参数值，使得多个稳定状态和周期性平衡共存。当获得多个稳定状态时，在某些情况下，种群达到哪个稳定状态完全取决于个体对传染病未来进程的预期，而与模型的初始条件无关。（†） 我们衷心感谢期刊匿名审稿人的意见和建议。本文献给 Lucy Hauser。
