School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, de Havilland Campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, United Kingdom.
Conscious Cogn. 2013 Sep;22(3):1142-51. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.01.002. Epub 2013 Jan 29.
This paper begins by reminding the reader of the standard arguments that sceptics offer for doubting that mirror neurons could constitute any kind of action understanding (Section 2). It then outlines the usual response to these sceptical worries made by believers (Section 3). An attempt to put flesh on this idea in terms of what brains understand is critically examined and found wanting (Section 4). The ensuing analysis shows that it is prima facie possible to develop a more tenable account of enactive understanding that would fit the bill (Section 5). However, a second look raises further questions about (A) what mirror neurons target and (B) what such targeting involves (Section 6). Finally it is concluded that while mirror neurons may play a central role in enabling non-mentalistic forms of intersubjective engagement this falls short of action understanding (Section 7).
本文首先提醒读者注意怀疑论者对镜像神经元是否能构成任何形式的行为理解提出的标准论点（第 2 节）。然后概述了信徒对这些怀疑论担忧的通常回应（第 3 节）。批判性地审视了用大脑理解的方式来阐述这一观点的尝试，并发现它存在不足（第 4 节）。随后的分析表明，表面上有可能提出一种更合理的关于生成理解的观点，以满足要求（第 5 节）。然而，进一步的审视提出了关于（A）镜像神经元的目标和（B）这种目标涉及的问题（第 6 节）。最后得出结论，虽然镜像神经元可能在使主体间非心理主义的互动形式成为可能方面发挥了核心作用，但这并不能等同于行为理解（第 7 节）。
