Greenberg D E
University Center for the Child and Family, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.
Int J Psychoanal. 1990;71 ( Pt 2):271-83.
The significance of 'Beyond the pleasure principle' (BPP) cannot be understood by focusing solely on its manifest content. BPP is the product of theoretical displacements and compromise formations the motivation for which lies in the innovations introduced in 'On narcissism'. These innovations threatened assumptions about conflict and rationality inherent in Freud's libido theory. In BPP Freud attempts to resolve these questions by recasting primary narcissism as an 'inorganic unity'. The coherence of BPP can be restored if we un do these displacements and read its latent content. BPP now appears as a theory of instinctual conflict developing out of primary narcissism. Such development cannot, however, be organized as Freud originally formulated it; we must revise the static assumptions inherent in Freud's developmental view. Further, the question of how anti-developmental regressive forces are kept in check can now be understood by seeing the fear of death as a defensive negation of primary narcissism. This negation mirrors the theoretical repression at work in BPP.
仅关注《超越快乐原则》（Beyond the pleasure principle，简称BPP）的显性内容，是无法理解其意义的。BPP是理论位移和妥协形成的产物，其动机源于《论自恋》（On narcissism）中引入的创新。这些创新对弗洛伊德力比多理论中固有的冲突和理性假设构成了威胁。在《超越快乐原则》中，弗洛伊德试图通过将原初自恋重塑为一种“无机统一体”来解决这些问题。如果我们消除这些位移并解读其潜在内容，《超越快乐原则》的连贯性就能得以恢复。如今，《超越快乐原则》呈现为一种从原初自恋发展而来的本能冲突理论。然而，这种发展不能按照弗洛伊德最初的表述方式来组织；我们必须修正弗洛伊德发展观中固有的静态假设。此外，现在通过将对死亡的恐惧视为对原初自恋的防御性否定，就能够理解反发展的退行力量是如何受到抑制的问题。这种否定反映了在《超越快乐原则》中起作用的理论压抑。
