Istvan M A
Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Texas A&M University, 322 YMCA Building, 4237 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-4237, USA.
Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci. 2013 Sep;44(3):327-35. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.05.020. Epub 2013 Jun 25.
My general aim is to clarify the foundational difference between Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins concerning what biological entities are the units of selection in the process of evolution by natural selection. First, I recapitulate Gould's central objection to Dawkins's view that genes are the exclusive units of selection. According to Gould, it is absurd for Dawkins to think that genes are the exclusive units of selection when, after all, genes are not the exclusive interactors: those agents directly engaged with, directly impacted by, environmental pressures. Second, I argue that Gould's objection still goes through even when we take into consideration Sterelny and Kitcher's defense of gene selectionism in their admirable paper "The Return of the Gene." Third, I propose a strategy for defending Dawkins that I believe obviates Gould's objection. Drawing upon Elisabeth Lloyd's careful taxonomy of the various understandings of the unit of selection at play in the philosophy of biology literature, my proposal involves realizing that Dawkins endorses a different understanding of the unit of selection than Gould holds him to, an understanding that does not require genes to be the exclusive interactors.
我的总体目标是阐明斯蒂芬·杰伊·古尔德和理查德·道金斯在自然选择进化过程中关于哪些生物实体是选择单位这一问题上的根本分歧。首先，我概述一下古尔德对道金斯认为基因是唯一选择单位这一观点的主要反对意见。按照古尔德的说法，道金斯认为基因是唯一选择单位是荒谬的，毕竟基因并非唯一的相互作用者：那些直接与环境压力相互作用、直接受环境压力影响的主体。其次，我认为即便我们考虑斯特林和基切尔在其令人赞赏的论文《基因的回归》中对基因选择主义的辩护，古尔德的反对意见仍然成立。第三，我提出一种为道金斯辩护的策略，我认为这种策略能消除古尔德的反对意见。借鉴伊丽莎白·劳埃德对生物学哲学文献中所涉及的选择单位的各种理解的细致分类，我的提议在于认识到达金斯所认可的选择单位的理解与古尔德所认为的不同，这种理解并不要求基因是唯一的相互作用者。
