Theor Med Bioeth. 2013 Dec;34(6):461-77. doi: 10.1007/s11017-013-9271-3.
Bioethicists working on national ethics commissions frequently think of themselves as advisors to the government, but distance themselves from any claims to actual authority. Governments however may find it beneficial to appear to defer to the authority of these commissions when designing laws and policies, and might appoint such commissions for exactly this reason. Where does the authority for setting laws and policies come from? This question is best answered from within a normative political philosophy. This paper explains the locus of moral authority as understood within one family of normative political theories--liberal political theories--and argues that most major "liberal" commentators have understood both the source and scope of ethics commissions' authority in a manner at odds with liberalism, rightly interpreted. The author argues that reexamining the implications of liberalism for bioethics commissions would mean changing what are considered valid criticisms of such commissions and also changing the content of national bioethics commission mandates. The author concludes that bioethicists who participate in such commissions ought to carefully examine their own views about the normative limits of governmental authority because such limits have important implications for the contribution that bioethicists can legitimately make to government commissions.
从事国家伦理委员会工作的生命伦理学家常常认为自己是政府的顾问，但却否认自己拥有实际权力。然而，政府在制定法律和政策时可能会发现，将权威推给这些委员会是有益的，并且可能正是出于这个原因才任命这些委员会。制定法律和政策的权力来自哪里？这个问题最好从规范性政治哲学内部回答。本文解释了规范性政治理论——自由政治理论——中的道德权威的来源，并认为，大多数主要的“自由”评论员都以与自由主义相悖的方式理解了伦理委员会的权力来源和范围，从正确的角度来解释。作者认为，重新审视自由主义对生物伦理委员会的影响意味着需要改变对这些委员会的有效批评，同时也需要改变国家生物伦理委员会任务的内容。作者得出结论，参与此类委员会的生命伦理学家应该仔细审视自己对政府权力的规范性限制的看法，因为这些限制对生命伦理学家可以为政府委员会做出的合法贡献具有重要意义。
