Philosophisches Seminar, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany ; Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
Front Psychol. 2013 Dec 19;4:931. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931. eCollection 2013.
This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call "conscious thought" is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense. Empirical data from research on mind wandering and nocturnal dreaming clearly show that phenomenally represented cognitive processing is mostly an automatic, non-agentive process and that personal-level cognition is an exception rather than the rule. This raises an interesting new version of the mind-body problem: How is subpersonal cognition causally related to personal-level thought? More fine-grained phenomenological descriptions for what we called "conscious thought" in the past are needed, as well as a functional decomposition of umbrella terms like "mind wandering" into different target phenomena and a better understanding of the frequent dynamic transitions between spontaneous, task-unrelated thought and meta-awareness. In an attempt to lay some very first conceptual foundations for the now burgeoning field of research on mind wandering, the third section proposes two new criteria for individuating single episodes of mind-wandering, namely, the "self-representational blink" (SRB) and a sudden shift in the phenomenological "unit of identification" (UI). I close by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between mind wandering research and philosophy of mind.
本文从心智哲学的角度对思维漫游进行了元理论探讨。它有两个核心主张。第一个主张是,在概念层面上,思维漫游可以被描述为一种特殊形式的心理自主性丧失。第二个主张是,考虑到经验限制,我们所谓的“有意识的思维”大多可以被分析为一种次人格过程,这种过程往往缺乏传统上被认为是个人认知标志的关键属性——例如心理代理、明确的、有意识地体验到的目标导向,或可用于否决控制。我声称,在我们大约三分之二的有意识的生命时间里,我们在这个意义上并不拥有心理自主性(M-自主性)。思维漫游和夜间做梦研究的经验数据清楚地表明,现象上表示的认知处理大多是一种自动的、非代理的过程,而个人认知则是例外而不是规则。这提出了一个有趣的新的心身问题版本:次人格认知如何与个人认知相关?我们过去称之为“有意识的思维”的更精细的现象学描述是必要的,以及对诸如“思维漫游”之类的伞状术语进行功能分解,将其分解为不同的目标现象,并更好地理解自发的、与任务无关的思维和元意识之间的频繁动态转换。为了尝试为现在蓬勃发展的思维漫游研究领域奠定一些初步的概念基础,第三部分提出了两个用于区分单个思维漫游事件的新标准,即“自我代表性眨眼”(SRB)和现象学“识别单位”(UI)的突然转变。最后,我指定了一系列潜在的创新研究目标,这些目标可以为思维漫游研究与心智哲学之间建立更强的联系提供服务。