McCarthy-Jones Simon
Department of Psychiatry, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
Front Artif Intell. 2019 Sep 26;2:19. doi: 10.3389/frai.2019.00019. eCollection 2019.
To lose freedom of thought (FoT) is to lose our dignity, our democracy and our very selves. Accordingly, the right to FoT receives absolute protection under international human rights law. However, this foundational right has been neither significantly developed nor often utilized. The contours of this right urgently need to be defined due to twenty-first century threats to FoT posed by new technologies. As such, this paper draws on law and psychology to consider what the right to FoT should be in the twenty-first century. After discussing contemporary threats to FoT, and recent developments in our understanding of thought that can inform the development of the right, this paper considers three elements of the right; the rights not to reveal one's thoughts, not to be penalized for one's thoughts, and not to have one's thoughts manipulated. The paper then considers, for each element, why it should exist, how the law currently treats it, and challenges that will shape it going forward. The paper concludes that the law should develop the right to FoT with the clear understanding that what this aims to secure is mental autonomy. This process should hence begin by establishing the core mental processes that enable mental autonomy, such as attentional and cognitive agency. The paper argues that the domain of the right to FoT should be extended to include external actions that are arguably constitutive of thought, including internet searches and diaries, hence shielding them with absolute protection. It is stressed that law must protect us from threats to FoT from both states and corporations, with governments needing to act under the positive aspect of the right to ensure societies are structured to facilitate mental autonomy. It is suggested that in order to support mental autonomy, information should be provided in autonomy-supportive contexts and friction introduced into decision making processes to facilitate second-order thought. The need for public debate about how society wishes to balance risk and mental autonomy is highlighted, and the question is raised as to whether the importance attached to thought has changed in our culture. The urgency of defending FoT is re-iterated.
失去思想自由(FoT)就是失去我们的尊严、我们的民主以及我们自身。因此,思想自由权在国际人权法下受到绝对保护。然而,这项基本权利既未得到充分发展,也未被频繁运用。由于新技术对21世纪的思想自由构成威胁,这项权利的轮廓亟待明确。因此,本文借鉴法律和心理学来思考21世纪的思想自由权应为何物。在讨论了当代对思想自由的威胁以及我们对思想的理解的最新进展(这些进展可为该权利的发展提供参考)之后,本文考虑了该权利的三个要素:不披露自己思想的权利、不因自己的思想而受惩罚的权利以及不使其思想被操纵的权利。然后,本文针对每个要素思考了其为何应存在、法律目前如何对待它以及未来将塑造它的挑战。本文的结论是,法律应在明确认识到其旨在保障的是精神自主性的情况下发展思想自由权。因此,这一过程应首先确立实现精神自主性的核心心理过程,如注意力和认知能动性。本文认为,思想自由权的范畴应扩大到包括可被视为思想构成要素的外部行为,如互联网搜索和日记,从而给予它们绝对保护。强调法律必须保护我们免受国家和企业对思想自由的威胁,政府需要根据该权利的积极方面采取行动,以确保社会结构有利于精神自主性。建议为了支持精神自主性,应在支持自主性的背景下提供信息,并在决策过程中引入摩擦以促进二阶思维。强调了就社会希望如何平衡风险和精神自主性进行公开辩论的必要性,并提出了在我们的文化中对思想的重视是否已发生变化的问题。重申了捍卫思想自由的紧迫性。