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如何管理医师与医院的交流:比利时医院中的合同与关系问题

How to govern physician-hospital exchanges: contractual and relational issues in Belgian hospitals.

作者信息

Trybou Jeroen, Gemmel Paul, Annemans Lieven

机构信息

Research Fellow in Health Services Research, Department of Public Health, Ghent University, Belgium

Professor of Healthcare & Services Management, Department of Management, Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Ghent University, Belgium.

出版信息

J Health Serv Res Policy. 2014 Jul;19(3):145-152. doi: 10.1177/1355819613518765. Epub 2014 Jan 27.

Abstract

OBJECTIVE

Our aim was to investigate contractual mechanisms in physician-hospital exchanges. The concepts of risk-sharing and the nature of physician-hospital exchanges - transactional versus relational - were studied.

METHODS

Two qualitative case studies were performed in Belgium. Hospital executives and physicians were interviewed to develop an in-depth understanding of contractual and relational issues that shape physician-hospital contracting in acute care hospitals. The underlying theoretical concepts of agency theory and social exchange theory were used to analyse the data.

RESULTS

Our study found that physician-hospital contracting is highly complex. The contract is far more than an economic instrument governing financial aspects. The effect of the contract on the nature of exchange - whether transactional or relational - also needs to be considered. While it can be argued that contractual governance methods are increasingly necessary to overcome the difficulties that arise from the fragmented payment framework by aligning incentives and sharing financial risk, they undermine the necessary relational governance. Relational qualities such as mutual trust and an integrative view on physician-hospital exchanges are threatened, and may be difficult to sustain, given the current fragmentary payment framework.

CONCLUSIONS

Since health care policy makers are increasing the financial risk borne by health care providers, it can be argued that this also increases the need to share financial risk and to align incentives between physician and hospital. However, our study demonstrates that while economic alignment is important in determining physician-hospital contracts, the corresponding impact on working relationships should also be considered. Moreover, it is important to avoid a relationship between hospital and physician predominantly characterized by transactional exchanges thereby fostering an unhealthy us-and-them divide and mentality. Relational exchange is a valuable alternative to contractual exchange, stimulating an integrated hospital-physician relationship. Unfortunately, the fragmented payment framework characterized by unaligned incentives is perceived as an obstacle to realize effective collaboration.

摘要

目的

我们的目标是研究医师与医院合作中的契约机制。对风险分担概念以及医师与医院合作的性质(交易型与关系型)进行了研究。

方法

在比利时开展了两项定性案例研究。对医院管理人员和医师进行了访谈,以深入了解影响急症医院中医师与医院签约的契约和关系问题。运用代理理论和社会交换理论的基础理论概念对数据进行分析。

结果

我们的研究发现,医师与医院签约非常复杂。合同远不止是一种管理财务方面的经济工具。还需要考虑合同对交换性质(无论是交易型还是关系型)的影响。虽然可以说,契约治理方法对于克服因支付框架碎片化而产生的困难(通过调整激励措施和分担财务风险)日益必要,但它们会破坏必要的关系治理。鉴于目前的碎片化支付框架,相互信任以及对医师与医院合作的整体看法等关系特质受到威胁,且可能难以维持。

结论

由于医疗保健政策制定者正在增加医疗保健提供者承担的财务风险,可以说这也增加了分担财务风险以及调整医师与医院之间激励措施的必要性。然而,我们的研究表明,虽然经济调整在确定医师与医院合同时很重要,但也应考虑对工作关系的相应影响。此外,重要的是要避免医院与医师之间的关系主要以交易型交换为特征,从而加剧不健康的“我们”与“他们”的分歧和心态。关系型交换是契约型交换的一种有价值的替代方式,可促进医院与医师之间的整合关系。不幸的是,以激励措施不一致为特征的碎片化支付框架被视为实现有效合作的障碍。

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