1Department of Social Psychology, Saarland University.
Psychol Sci. 2014 Apr;25(4):954-62. doi: 10.1177/0956797613520168. Epub 2014 Feb 13.
The current research establishes a first-mover disadvantage in negotiation. We propose that making the first offer in a negotiation will backfire when the sender reveals private information that an astute recipient can leverage to his or her advantage. In two experiments, we manipulated whether the first offer was purely distributive or revealed that the sender's preferences were compatible with the recipient's preferences (i.e., the negotiators wanted the same outcome on an issue). When first offers contained only distributive issues, the classic first-mover advantage occurred, and first offers predicted final prices. However, a first-mover disadvantage emerged when senders opened with offers that revealed compatible preferences. These effects were moderated by negotiators' social value orientation: Proself negotiators were more likely to take advantage of compatible information than were prosocial negotiators. Overall, the key factor that determined whether the first-mover advantage or disadvantage emerged was whether the offer revealed compatible preferences. These results demonstrate that first offers not only provide numerical value but also convey qualitative information.
当前的研究确立了谈判中的先动劣势。我们提出，当发件人透露敏感收件人可以利用的私人信息以谋取优势时，谈判中的先发报价将适得其反。在两个实验中，我们操纵了第一个报价是纯粹的分配性报价还是揭示了发件人的偏好与收件人的偏好是一致的（即谈判者在一个问题上希望得到相同的结果）。当首次报价仅包含分配性问题时，就会出现经典的先动优势，首次报价预测最终价格。然而，当发件人提出显示出一致偏好的报价时，就会出现先动劣势。这些影响受到谈判者的社会价值取向的调节：以自我为中心的谈判者比利他主义的谈判者更有可能利用一致的信息。总体而言，决定先动优势还是劣势出现的关键因素是报价是否揭示了一致的偏好。这些结果表明，首次报价不仅提供数值价值，还传达定性信息。
