Bryce Donna, Bratzke Daniel
Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen, Schleichstrasse 4, 72076 Tübingen, Germany.
Conscious Cogn. 2014 Jul;27:254-67. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.05.011. Epub 2014 Jun 21.
Reports of introspective reaction times (iRTs) have been used to investigate conscious awareness during dual-task situations. Previous studies showed that dual-task costs in RTs (the psychological refractory period, PRP, effect) are not reflected in participants' introspective reports. This finding has been attributed to conscious awareness of Task 2 being delayed while Task 1 is centrally processed. Here, we test this Temporal model and compare it to an alternative that assumes participants base their iRTs on experienced difficulty. We collected iRTs and difficulty estimates after each trial of a PRP paradigm in which the perceptual difficulty of either Task 2 (Experiment 1) or Task 1 (Experiment 2) was manipulated. Our results largely support the difficulty-based account, suggesting that in a dual-task situation, iRTs do not reflect timing of cognitive processes but are strongly influenced by the experience of difficulty.
内省反应时间（iRTs）报告已被用于研究双重任务情境中的意识觉知。先前的研究表明，反应时间的双重任务成本（心理不应期，PRP，效应）并未在参与者的内省报告中体现出来。这一发现归因于在集中处理任务1时，任务2的意识觉知被延迟。在此，我们测试了这个时间模型，并将其与另一种假设参与者基于所体验到的难度来确定iRTs的模型进行比较。我们在一个PRP范式的每次试验后收集了iRTs和难度估计值，其中任务2（实验1）或任务1（实验2）的感知难度被操纵。我们的结果在很大程度上支持基于难度的解释，表明在双重任务情境中，iRTs并不反映认知过程的时间安排，而是受到难度体验的强烈影响。
