Huggett Nick
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
Ann N Y Acad Sci. 2014 Oct;1326:9-17. doi: 10.1111/nyas.12514. Epub 2014 Sep 2.
This paper investigates the mathematical representation of time in physics. In existing theories, time is represented by the real numbers, hence their formal properties represent properties of time: these are surveyed. The central question of the paper is whether the existing representation of time is adequate, or whether it can or should be supplemented: especially, do we need a physics incorporating some kind of "dynamical passage" of time? The paper argues that the existing mathematical framework is resistant to such changes, and might have to be rejected by anyone seeking a physics of passage. Then it rebuts two common arguments for incorporating passage into physics, especially the claim that it is an element of experience. Finally, the paper investigates whether, as has been claimed, causal set theory provides a physics of passage.
本文探讨了物理学中时间的数学表示。在现有理论中，时间由实数表示，因此其形式属性代表了时间的属性：本文对此进行了综述。本文的核心问题是，现有的时间表示是否足够，或者是否可以或应该进行补充：特别是，我们是否需要一种纳入某种时间“动态流逝”的物理学？本文认为，现有的数学框架难以做出此类改变，任何寻求时间流逝物理学的人可能都不得不摒弃它。然后，本文反驳了将时间流逝纳入物理学的两个常见论点，尤其是那种认为它是经验要素的说法。最后，本文研究了因果集理论是否如人们所宣称的那样，提供了一种时间流逝的物理学。
