Petsoulas Christina, Allen Pauline, Checkland Kath, Coleman Anna, Segar Julia, Peckham Stephen, Mcdermott Imelda
Department of Health Services Research and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.
Centre for Primary Care, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK.
BMJ Open. 2014 Oct 15;4(10):e005970. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2014-005970.
The 2010 healthcare reform in England introduced primary care-led commissioning in the National Health Service (NHS) by establishing clinical commissioning groups (CCGs). A key factor for the success of the reform is the provision of excellent commissioning support services to CCGs. The Government's aim is to create a vibrant market of competing providers of such services (from both for-profit and not-for-profit sectors). Until this market develops, however, commissioning support units (CSUs) have been created from which CCGs are buying commissioning support functions. This study explored the attitudes of CCGs towards outsourcing commissioning support functions during the initial stage of the reform.
The research took place between September 2011 and June 2012. We used a case study research design in eight CCGs, conducting in-depth interviews, observation of meetings and analysis of policy documents.
SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: We conducted 96 interviews and observed 146 meetings (a total of approximately 439 h).
Many CCGs were reluctant to outsource core commissioning support functions (such as contracting) for fear of losing local knowledge and trusted relationships. Others were disappointed by the absence of choice and saw CSUs as monopolies and a recreation of the abolished PCTs. Many expressed doubts about the expectation that outsourcing of commissioning support functions will result in lower administrative costs.
Given the nature of healthcare commissioning, outsourcing vital commissioning support functions may not be the preferred option of CCGs. Considerations of high transaction costs, and the risk of fragmentation of services and loss of trusted relationships involved in short-term contracting, may lead most CCGs to decide to form long-term partnerships with commissioning support suppliers in the future. This option, however, limits competition by creating 'network closure' and calls into question the Government's intention to create a vibrant market of commissioning support provision.
2010年英国医疗改革通过设立临床委托小组(CCG)在国民医疗服务体系(NHS)中引入了以初级医疗为导向的委托模式。改革成功的一个关键因素是为CCG提供优质的委托支持服务。政府的目标是创建一个充满活力的市场,让营利性和非营利性部门的此类服务供应商相互竞争。然而,在这个市场发展起来之前,已经设立了委托支持单位(CSU),CCG可以从这些单位购买委托支持职能。本研究探讨了CCG在改革初期对外包委托支持职能的态度。
研究于2011年9月至2012年6月进行。我们在8个CCG中采用了案例研究设计,进行了深入访谈、会议观察和政策文件分析。
背景/参与者:我们进行了96次访谈,观察了146次会议(总计约439小时)。
许多CCG因担心失去本地知识和信任关系而不愿外包核心委托支持职能(如合同签订)。其他人则因缺乏选择而感到失望,并将CSU视为垄断机构和已废除的初级保健信托基金(PCT)的翻版。许多人对委托支持职能外包会降低行政成本的期望表示怀疑。
鉴于医疗委托的性质,外包重要的委托支持职能可能不是CCG的首选方案。对高交易成本的考虑,以及短期合同中涉及的服务碎片化风险和信任关系丧失的风险,可能会导致大多数CCG未来决定与委托支持供应商建立长期合作关系。然而,这种选择通过创造“网络封闭”限制了竞争,并对政府创建一个充满活力的委托支持服务市场的意图提出了质疑。