Han The Anh, Pereira Luís Moniz, Lenaerts Tom
AI lab, Computer Science Department, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium MLG, Département d'Informatique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Boulevard du Triomphe CP212, 1050 Brussels, Belgium School of Computing, Teesside University, Borough Road, Middlesbrough TS1 3BA, UK
Centro de Inteligência Artificial (CENTRIA), Departamento de Informática, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal.
J R Soc Interface. 2015 Feb 6;12(103). doi: 10.1098/rsif.2014.1203.
When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide a strategic solution that leads to substantial levels of cooperation in the context of public goods games, results that are corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as with other approaches, fully exclude the presence of defectors, raising the question of how they can be dealt with to avoid the demise of the common good. We show that both avoiding creation of the common good, whenever full agreement is not reached, and limiting the benefit that disagreeing defectors can acquire, using costly restriction mechanisms, are relevant choices. Nonetheless, restriction mechanisms are found the more favourable, especially in larger group interactions. Given decreasing restriction costs, introducing restraining measures to cope with public goods free-riding issues is the ultimate advantageous solution for all participants, rather than avoiding its creation.
在创造公共物品时，需要策略或机制来应对搭便车者。我们首先通过数学和数值方法表明，带有事后补偿的事先协议提供了一种策略性解决方案，在公共物品博弈的背景下能促成高水平的合作，现有实验数据证实了这一结果。尽管取得了这一成功，但与其他方法一样，无法完全排除搭便车者的存在，这就引出了如何应对他们以避免公共利益消亡的问题。我们表明，在未达成完全一致时避免创造公共物品，以及使用成本高昂的限制机制来限制持不同意见的搭便车者能够获得的利益，都是相关的选择。然而，限制机制被认为更有利，尤其是在较大规模群体互动中。鉴于限制成本不断降低，引入约束措施来应对公共物品搭便车问题对所有参与者来说是最终的有利解决方案，而不是避免创造公共物品。
