Cowley Christopher
J Med Ethics. 2016 Feb;42(2):69-72. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2015-102692. Epub 2015 Apr 17.
A recent issue of the journal Bioethics discussed whether conscientious objectors within the healthcare context should be required to give their reasons to a specially convened tribunal, who would have the power to reject the objection. This is modeled on the context of military conscription. Advocates for such a tribunal offer two different justifications, one based on determining the genuineness of the applicant's beliefs, the other based on determining their reasonableness. I limit my discussion to a doctor's objection to abortion in the UK, and argue against both justifications: I thereby defend the status quo, where such doctors are not formally required to defend their beliefs. My argument has to do with the particular nature of the abortion debate in the UK, and the more general nature of ethical disagreement.
最近一期的《生物伦理学》杂志讨论了医疗领域中的出于良心拒服兵役者是否应被要求向专门召集的法庭陈述理由，该法庭有权驳回异议。这是以征兵背景为蓝本的。支持设立这样一个法庭的人提出了两种不同的理由，一种基于确定申请人信仰的真实性，另一种基于确定其合理性。我将讨论范围限定在英国医生对堕胎的反对意见上，并对这两种理由都提出反对：由此我捍卫了现状，即这类医生在形式上无需为自己的信仰辩护。我的论点与英国堕胎辩论的特殊性质以及伦理分歧的更普遍性质有关。
