Persson Ulf, Jönsson Bengt
The Swedish Institute for Health Economics (IHE), Box 2127, SE-22002, Lund, Sweden.
School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
Appl Health Econ Health Policy. 2016 Feb;14(1):1-8. doi: 10.1007/s40258-015-0182-5.
All 28 EU member states except Sweden and the UK apply international reference pricing (IRP), international price comparison, external reference pricing or cross-reference pricing. The attractiveness of using prices of other countries as a benchmark for decisions within a national price control is obvious. Alternative models for price and reimbursement decision making such as value-based pricing (VBP), i.e. cost-effectiveness analyses, are more complicated. However, IRP provides incentives for stakeholders to take action not in line with optimal (welfare-maximizing) pricing. IRP is costly for two reasons. First, manufacturers are incentivised to limit or delay access to new innovative treatments in countries with small markets and/or a low income, which can be costly in terms of loss of health. Second, all countries also experience a loss of welfare (health) because IRP reduces the opportunities for differential pricing (Ramsey pricing), i.e. using the fact that the ability and willingness to pay differs between countries. Thus, IRP results in less sales revenue to finance research and development of new innovative drugs. We can now observe that payers and manufacturers are engaged in different types of risk-sharing schemes, price-volume negotiations, payback arrangements, confidential discounts, coverage with evidence developments, etc., all with the purpose of returning to the old model of price discrimination and Ramsey pricing. Shortly, real prices for use in IRP systems will cease to exist and, thus, we expect to soon see the end of IRP, a new system for price discrimination and an increasing demand for VBP.
除瑞典和英国外,欧盟的所有28个成员国都采用国际参考定价(IRP)、国际价格比较、外部参考定价或交叉参考定价。将其他国家的价格用作国家价格管制决策基准的吸引力显而易见。诸如基于价值的定价(VBP),即成本效益分析等价格和报销决策的替代模式则更为复杂。然而,国际参考定价促使利益相关者采取不符合最优(福利最大化)定价的行动。国际参考定价成本高昂有两个原因。首先,制造商受到激励,在市场规模小和/或收入低的国家限制或推迟新创新疗法的获取,这在健康损失方面可能代价高昂。其次,所有国家也都经历福利(健康)损失,因为国际参考定价减少了差别定价(拉姆齐定价)的机会,即利用各国支付能力和意愿不同这一事实。因此,国际参考定价导致用于资助新创新药物研发的销售收入减少。我们现在可以看到,支付方和制造商正在参与不同类型的风险分担计划、价格-数量谈判、回报安排、秘密折扣、有证据支持的覆盖范围等,所有这些都是为了回归价格歧视和拉姆齐定价的旧模式。简而言之,国际参考定价系统中使用的实际价格将不复存在,因此,我们预计很快会看到国际参考定价的终结、一种新的价格歧视系统以及对基于价值定价的需求不断增加。